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ABSTRACT
The vehicle industry is quickly becoming more connected and growing. This growth is due to
advancements in cyber physical systems (CPSs) that enhance the safety and automation in vehicle.
The modern automobile consists of more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) that communi-
cate and interact with each other over automotive bus systems. Passenger comforts, infotainment
features, and connectivity continue to progress through the growth and integration of Internet-of-
Things (IoT) technologies. Common networks include the Controller Area Network (CAN), Local
Interconnect Network (LIN), and FlexRay. However, the benefits of increased connectivity and
features comes with the penalty of increased vulnerabilities. Security is lacking in preventing at-
tacks on safety-critical control systems. I will explore the state of the art methods and approaches
researchers have taken to identify threats and how to address them with intrusion detection. I
discuss the development of a hybrid based intrusion detection approach that combines anomaly
and signature based detection methods.
Machine learning is a hot topic in security as it is a method of learning and classifying system
behavior and can detect intrusions that alter normal behavior. In this paper, we discuss utilizing
machine learning algorithms to assist in classifying CAN messages. I present work that focuses
on the reverse engineering and classification of CAN messages. The problem is that even though
CAN is standardized, the implementation may vary for different manufacturers and vehicle models.
These implementations are kept secret, therefore CAN messages for every vehicle needs to be
analyzed and reverse engineered in order to get information. Due to the lack of publicly available
CAN specifications, attackers and researchers need to reverse engineer messages to pinpoint which
messages will have the desired impact. The reverse engineering process is needed by researchers
and hackers for all manufacturers and their respective vehicles to understand what the vehicle is
xi
doing and what each CAN message means. The knowledge of the specifications of CAN messages
can improve the effectiveness of security mechanisms applied to CAN.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The vehicle industry is quickly becoming more connected and growing. This growth is due
to advancements in cyber physical systems (CPSs) that enhance the safety and automation in
vehicle. The modern automobile consists of more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) that
communicate and interact with each other over automotive bus systems [8]. Passenger comforts,
infotainment features, and connectivity continue to progress through the growth and integration
of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. Common networks include the Controller Area Network
(CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), and FlexRay. I focus specifically on CAN, which is the
most commonly used bus system.
However, the benefits of increased connectivity and features comes with the penalty of increased
vulnerabilities [99, 96], as demonstrated in Figure 1.1. Security is lacking in preventing attacks
against comfort and infotainment features from compromising safety-critical control systems [9].
Cyber attacks on automotive in-vehicle networks have risen [9, 7, 97] and this has driven a need
for security in vehicles. Koscher et al. [38] demonstrated the ability of malicious agents to control
several vehicle operations from unlocking the doors to stopping the engine. Miller and Valasek
demonstrated their ability to control a Jeep Cherokee remotely through a cellular network, leading
to the recall of over a million vehicles [52].
As an communication network develop in 1983 without cybersecurity in mind, the CAN bus has
become an enticing target for hackers. The CAN protocol does not have origin and destination for
messages. Instead, each node in network can send and receive messages based on the pre-defined
ECU configuration. As the standard in modern vehicles, CAN has become an enticing target for
hackers. An adversary may physically access the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) port standard in all
modern vehicles. Or they may remotely access the vehicle through a variety of wireless or cellular
2
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Figure 1.1 Automotive attack surfaces.
connections. Thus, a major security concern is in protecting the CAN bus that facilitates the
communication and interactions of ECUs.
One option to enhance the security of in-vehicle networks is to adopt intrusion detection and pre-
vention techniques. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are used to mitigate intrusions in computer
network systems. However, many traditional techniques in network security cannot be directly
applied to vehicular networks. The limited computational, memory, and power resources in ECUs
hinder the implementation of complex security mechanisms. Thus, an effective and efficient IDS
that can work for in-vehicle networks is an important need.
I will explore the state of the art methods and approaches researchers have taken to identify
threats against vehicles and how to address them with IDS approaches. I discuss the development of
a hybrid based intrusion detection approach that combines anomaly and signature based detection
methods. I will detail the individual components of each approach and how they were developed
and evaluated.
Machine learning is a hot topic in security as it is a method of learning and classifying system
behavior and can detect intrusions that alter normal behavior. In this paper, I discuss utilizing
machine learning algorithms to assist in classifying CAN messages. The proposed approach employs
the k-means and agglomerative clustering to categorize CAN messages. The distance between CAN
message IDs are used to cluster the CAN messages by relevance to each other. The machine learning
algorithm, combined with previously labeled CAN IDs, classifies CAN messages. The goal is to
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determine the function of unknown CAN messages using machine learning and labels. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper toward utilizing machine learning in reverse engineering
CAN messages without access to a physical vehicle nor having a DBC file.
I present work that focuses on the reverse engineering and classification of CAN messages.
The problem is that even though CAN is standardized, the implementation may vary for different
manufacturers and vehicle models. These implementations are kept secret, therefore CAN messages
for every vehicle needs to be analyzed and reverse engineered in order to get information. Due
to the lack of publicly available CAN specifications, attackers and researchers need to reverse
engineer messages to pinpoint which messages will have the desired impact. The reverse engineering
process is needed by researchers and hackers for all manufacturers and their respective vehicles to
understand what the vehicle is doing and what each CAN message means. The knowledge of the
specifications of CAN messages can improve the effectiveness of security mechanisms applied to
CAN.
1.1 Objectives
This paper aims to identify the constraints and requirements of developing intrusion detection
systems for modern vehicles. Presented are findings to contribute to a deeper understanding of
the challenges of implementing IDS for in-vehicle networks. The research questions that drive this
research are:
• What are the considerations that need to be made in designing an IDS?
• What vulnerabilities exist in vehicles and what can be done to secure them?
• How can an attack be detected and how does the automotive system respond?
• Can machine learning be utilized towards reverse engineer CAN messages?
• What features exist in raw CAN messages and what features can be extracted?
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• What metrics should be used to evaluate the success and shortcomings of our detection and
classification approaches?
1.2 Contributions
There is numerous research that highlight the importance of integrating security into in-vehicle
networks. However, due to the complex nature of these approaches, they cannot be easily imple-
mented. To further advance vehicle security, a greater understanding is required of the vehicle
traffic. Provided are the following contributions to address these issues.
• Frequency-based anomaly detector. The design and implementation of a frequency-based IDS
that can identify message injection attacks using the frequencies of CAN messages to capture
normal behavior and then detect violations of the normal as signs of an attack.
• HAIDS:Hybrid Automotive Intrusion Detection System. The design and implementation of an
IDS that combines anomaly and signature-based detection methods for a more comprehensive
detection system.
• Machine learning messages classifier. An approach towards classifying unknown controller
area network messages utilizing hierarchical clustering.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives background information on the con-
troller are network and its vulnerabilities. I discuss the security challenges and attacker motivations.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive survey on intrusion detection and related work on automotive
intrusion detection systems. Chapter 4 outlines the details of our approach towards automotive
intrusion detection. I break down the different message timing features I examined and utilized.
Chapter 5 details the hybrid automotive intrusion detection system, called HAIDS. I outline the
details of the anomaly and signature based detectors for intrusion detection. Additionally, the
evaluation and analysis of HAIDS is discussed. Chapter 6 delves into the CAN reverse engineering
process using machine learning. This chapter provides background on reverse engineering and ma-
chine learning, to help get the reader up to speed. Also, related work on novel approaches of reverse
5
engineering CAN and utilizing machine learning towards CAN are investigated. This chapter also
details the reverse engineering process using hierarchical clustering and reports the evaluation and
analysis of our message classification. Chapter 7 outlines the future work of using machine learning
towards automotive security. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation.
6
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, provided are details into in-vehicle networks, their vulnerabilities, and how
attackers are exploiting these openings.
A network is a system of interconnected devices where information is shared. While a standard
local area network consists of a group of computers, printers, and other devices,communicating
and sharing resources with each other, an in-vehicle network consists of several control units.
These control units include engine control systems, transmission control systems, electronic control
systems. These units communicate via the data bus in real-time to manage vehicle operation.
Electronic systems in vehicles are connected to each other. The demand for enhanced safety,
comfort, and infotainment have increased the number of electronic systems in vehicles.
An in-vehicle network consists of nodes, gateways, and buses. A node is an ECU, which is
connected to the bus. Together these buses and nodes form a network. Gateways connect different
in-vehicle networks together. There are many different types of network bus domains in an vehicle,
with the most common one being the controller area network.
2.1 Controller Area Network
The controller area network (CAN) was created to reduce the network complexity and wiring
costs by simplifying current mechanical wiring in vehicles with a two-wire bus. CAN is an asyn-
chronous, serial, multi-master communication network protocol that connects ECUs [14]. Vehicles,
airplanes, and industrial machinery utilize CAN as a serial communication protocol. CAN supports
bit rates in the range of 1Kbps to 1Mbps. Low speed CAN normally has data rates up to 125Kbps
while the high speed CAN has data rates up to 1Mbps.
CAN is a message-based protocol that uses a lossless bitwise arbitration to transmit binary
signal data. It uses the term dominant bits to represent the logical 0 and recessive bits for the
7
logical 1 signals. When the voltage difference between the two wires is large, the state is dominant.
The state is recessive when the voltage difference is small between the two wires. Dominant state
overwrites the recessive state when two or more ECUs send messages at the same time.
The CAN bus communication follows the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model for dif-
ferent layers: application, object, transfer, and physical. The broadcast nature of the CAN bus
means that transmitted data are received by all ECUs on the bus. Data is transmitted between
ECUs in the data frame of CAN packets, which consists of an ID field, data field, cyclic redundancy
check (CRC), and other fields seen in Figure 2.1. CAN efficiently implements static fixed priority
non-preemptive scheduling of messages through bus arbitration. CAN messages may be periodic,
sporadic, or aperiodic. Periodic messages arrive at regular intervals with fixed lengths called pe-
riods. Sporadic messages recur with a minimum inter-arrival time between successive messages,
while aperiodic messages occur at arbitrary times. The period of a messages is the fixed time in-
terval after which a message releases another message. Each transmitted message goes through the
arbitration process to determine which wins the bus. When a message wins arbitration and starts
transmitting, it becomes non-preemptable. Messages win arbitration according to their priority,
which is determined by the messages identifier (ID). A message with a lower ID has higher priority.
An important feature of CAN is the MAC protocol Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA). It manages and avoids communication collisions, in the case of several
nodes trying to access and send frames on the bus at the same time. When two or more ECUs
start transmitting messages simultaneously, arbitration is done and the messages with the lowest
message ID wins. The ECU which is attempting to transmit a recessive bit cancels its transmission,
because it recognizes the other ECU’s attempt to transmit a message with higher priority.
The CAN bus does not implement security mechanism such as encryption, authorization or
authentication. The CAN architecture was envisioned to be lightweight and robust and designed to
be unsegmented, unencrypted, and lacking authentication so that CAN messages could flow freely
to and from each ECU. However, these properties directly lead to CAN’s security vulnerabilities.
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Figure 2.1 Standard CAN frame format.
2.2 CAN Messages
Message transfer is established and controlled by four different frame types: data, remote, error,
and overload frame. The data frame transfers data between the nodes on the bus. A unit on the bus
transmits the remote frame to request the transmission of the data frame with the same identifier.
On bus error detection, an error frame is transmitted by any unit in the bus. The overload frame
is used to provide an extra delay between the leading and succeeding data or remote frames.
Controller area messages can be sniffed and logged from the CAN bus. It is standard for
recorded CAN data to consist of a time stamp for the message, the message ID of each message,
and the individual 8 bytes of data that make up the Data field. CAN ID and data fields are
presented in hexadecimal form. Below is an example of a single CAN message. The first field is
the time stamp of when the message was captured on the bus. The 2nd field is the CAN message
ID. The last 8 fields are the 8 bytes that make up the data field for the CAN message.
0.000248134, 202, 0C, EE, 72, 6D, 60, 00, 00, 00
It can be seen that not every field is recorded by some CAN snooping software. Depending on
how the CAN messages are captured, more or less information may be available. What I present
are the standard fields that useful software will present.
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2.3 Vulnerabilities of CAN
There have been several publicized attacks on the vehicular network by researchers [4, 7, 27].
Securing automotive in-vehicle networks is challenging because of the resource constraints and
the need to maintain predictable performance of the ECUs. Due to their low-cost nature and
low data rates, most ECUs have limited computing power and memory to implement security
mechanisms. Automotive networks have significantly lower transmission capability compared to
network systems. CAN is susceptible to eavesdropping, denial-of-service, message injection, and
impersonation attacks because of its broadcast nature, lack of authentication, and encryption.
2.3.1 Lack of Message Authentication
Each ECU broadcasts and receives all data on the CAN bus then decides whether messages
are meant for them. CAN by design is unable to prevent unauthorized devices from joining the
bus and broadcasting malicious messages to all the ECUs. By accessing the bus, hackers can send
spoofed messages to any ECU on the network. Security in this context is provided only through
a lack of open documentation. A hacker needs to dedicate time and resources to reverse engineer
the CAN protocol before being able to launch malicious attacks on a particular vehicle.
2.3.2 Unsegmented Network
All ECUs are connected to a common network. This is a major reason CAN was adopted in
automotive networks, to reduce the need of point-to-point connections between automotive systems.
However, this reduction means a system component dealing with infotainment can communicate
to safety critical vehicle systems. While some manufacturers utilize different networks for safety-
critical systems, there is still cross-communication between safety critical and non-critical systems.
2.3.3 Unencrypted Messages
CAN was designed to be lightweight and robust back in the 1980s, when car hacking was not
a reality. Addition of encryption would only slow down CAN messages and clog the network.
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However, because CAN traffic is unencrypted, it can be easily sniffed, spoofed, modified, and
replayed. There is a large area of research in applying encryption to automotive networks [5, 58,
44, 3, 64, 75].
Knowing these vulnerabilities, I examine how attackers could take advantage of them and to
determine how to secure these vulnerabilities.
2.4 Threats and Attacks
To address the security concerns of modern vehicles, security analysis is needed in the devel-
opment process. Threat modeling is a technique for security analysis using a structured approach
that identifies security threats. A good threat model captures the possible attacks, motivations of
attackers, and their capabilities to achieve their goals. With a threat model, a system designer can
evaluate threats to the system and identify the vulnerabilities and attack-able vectors.
Threat modeling is a whole sub-field in automotive security. Beyond identifying vulnerabilities
that can be exploited, a good understanding of potential attackers, their capabilities, and their
objectives is needed. In this section I give an examination of attackers and attack vectors in
vehicles.
2.4.1 Attackers and Motivations
Past attacker taxonomies [66] are based at least partially on the intentions of the attacker.
Beginner attackers are amateurs or script kiddies that have limited security knowledge but know
just enough to exploit security flaws with tools made by more knowledgeable hackers. These
knowledgeable hackers can be known as crackers and vandals. These hackers have the security
knowledge to seek out specific data utilizing security vulnerabilities. Lastly, the category of career
criminals are individuals with the knowledge, skill set, and focused objective for monetary gain.
Modern vehicles contain multiple interfaces that expose the vehicle’s systems to cyber attacks
through physical and wireless access.
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• Physical access: The attacker has direct connection to the OBD port in the vehicle that is
connected to the CAN bus and all ECUs. This port can be accessed with the right tools and
opportunity. An attacker can plug a small dongle to the OBD port to gather information
or inject messages. An attacker can also plug a wireless device to the port and access it
remotely [9].
• Wireless access: The more critical of the two attack surfaces. An attacker does not need phys-
ical access to the vehicle. These attack surfaces include Bluetooth and the telematics common
in modern vehicles for wireless and cellular connectivity. Miller and Valasek demonstrated
unauthorized CAN bus access to a Jeep Cherokee through its WiFi network that exploited a
weakness in its password generation protocol [52].
Further research needs to be done in determining the objectives of different attackers and what
methods they can use to accomplish their goals. Understanding the motivations, goals and methods
of attackers helps with developing methods to prevent their attacks.
Some primary motivations for attacking vehicles include:
• Research: Attacks can be performed by security experts; this process is known as penetration
testing.
• Illegal Profit: Attacker aims to profit by stealing a vehicle, stealing information on the vehicle,
or other illegal activities.
• Illegal Falsification: Attacker aims to alter actual vehicle information such as odometer read-
ings to increase the vehicle’s value.
• Remote Hijacking: Attacker aims to take control and operate a vehicle while it is in use.
The attacks demonstrated by these works [38, 9, 52, 1, 18, 96, 90] can be broken down into the
following categories:
• Sniffing: Because CAN does not support confidentiality and every CAN message is broadcast
to every node on the network, an attacker can sniff and eavesdrop all CAN messages.
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• Unauthorized Data Injection: An attacker can execute a replay attack easily because they
can sniff all messages transmitted on the CAN. An attacker can also impersonate an ECU
and transmit arbitrary messages on the network through message injection.
• Denial of Service: It is trivial for an attacker to continuously send high-priority messages over
the OBD-II port, thereby keeping the network busy and unavailable to the rest of the ECUs
on the network.
Each of these attack vectors tie into one another. Typically attackers start by sniffing CAN messages
on the network and then reverse engineer them. After understanding specific CAN messages, they
can then inject specific messages onto the network to make the vehicle misbehave. Through message
injection, an attacker can launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack and disable the network and the
vehicle [78]. A core component in most modern attacks is unauthorized data injection.
Unauthorized data injection can be broken down into several categories:
• Injecting a single CAN message ID: Inject a single CAN packet repeatedly. The goal is to
make the vehicle do what the message is commanding.
• Injecting multiple messages: Similar to single CAN message injection but injecting multiple
CAN IDs onto the network to make the vehicle misbehave.
• Massive message injection to perform a DoS attack: This is also known as message flooding,
where there is an influx of messages on the network.
• Bus-off attack: By iteratively injecting attack messages, the adversary coerces the transmit
error counter (TEC) of an un-compromised victim ECU to continuously increase, deceiving
it to think it is defective, which triggers the CAN fault confinement to force the victim or
even the entire network to shutdown [11, 29].
A defining characteristic of injection attacks is how they affect the timing intervals of CAN mes-
sages. The interval between messages decreases because the original ECU continues to transmit its
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messages as attackers are injecting their own malicious messages. I will focus on different attack
scenarios, all with an adversary whose goal is to control the vehicle.
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CHAPTER 3. RELATED WORK
3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are software or hardware systems that automate the attack
detection process, usually through use of sensors and reporting systems. Most modern IDS monitor
either the host computers or networks to capture intrusion related data [70, 79, 94, 101, 68, 73,
69, 64]. The sensors are monitoring agents on the network. They collect real time network or host
data to detect malicious activities. I examine approaches and implementations of traditional IDS
and how these principles can be applied to automotive security.
3.1.1 Host-based
A Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) resides in and monitors the host system. The
IDS monitors activity such as process events and system calls. In automobiles, a host-based IDS
would reside in individual ECUs, where it monitors the traffic packets entering and leaving, and
check to ensure packets are not malicious. HIDS also monitors the ECU itself to detect behavior
indicative of an intrusion. The issue with host-based IDS is that some ECUs lack the processing
power required to support a HIDS. Implementing a HIDS in automobiles would require re-work on
the part of manufacturers on their ECUs.
3.1.2 Network-based
A Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is part of the communication system and
monitors all traffic traversing the network. Information monitored include header and content of
each message or packet. An automotive NIDS monitors all traffic on the network with the NIDS
acting as an ECU, so that it can receive and monitor all messages broadcast.
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3.2 Intrusion Detection Methods
Intrusion detection methods can be classified under two main categories: signature and anomaly-
based. IDSs can only detect an intrusion, they are not able to offer protections for networks or
information systems. Preventative and reactive measures against intrusions have to be implemented
in order to secure a network.
3.2.1 Signature-Based
Signature-based approaches detect attacks using a pre-defined knowledge base of attack signa-
tures that is captured and created, and current network traffic is monitored for these signatures.
This detection mechanism is effective in detecting known attacks with high accuracy and low error
rates. However, signature-based IDSs cannot detect any attack not defined in the database, and
therefore are unable to detect new attacks, nor any deviation from known attacks. It is critical to
maintain the knowledge base and update it frequently for accurate detection.
3.2.2 Anomaly-Based
Anomaly-based intrusion detection typically starts with a training or normal model of the
system’s activity. To obtain best accuracy in detection, the normal model must be thorough. The
IDS then compares current system’s activity to past captured normal model to detect variations
in behavior and label those deviations as anomalies. Any deviation not captured in the normal
profile could be correctly or mistakenly identified as an intrusion. It is important to have the most
complete normal profile, so the system does not suffer from high rates of false positives. The main
advantage of anomaly detection is its ability to identify new and previously unknown attacks.
Although anomaly detection can be effective in detecting previously unknown attacks, the use
of anomalies to infer intrusions suffers from a few key challenges:
• Defining a normal model that encompasses all possible expected behavior is extremely diffi-
cult. The boundary between normal and anomalous behavior is often blurred.
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• Normal continues to evolve, and what is normal currently may not be so in the future.
• Anomalies may not be a result of malicious actions. Data often contains noise which may
produce anomalies that can be difficult to distinguish from attacks.
• Attackers try to mask their actions to appear normal, therefore making the task of defining
a tight boundary around normal more important, and also more difficult.
To address these challenges, researchers have used different types of intrusion detection systems
and methods, and will detail these.
IDSs vary in data sources and the specific techniques used to analyze this data. Signature-
based detect attacks are effective in detecting known attacks with low error rates, but they cannot
detect any attack not in the database of signatures, and therefore are unable to detect newly
created attacks nor any deviation of known attacks. Anomaly-based detection can infer an attack
is occurring if network traffic deviates from the normal model, which enables detecting new attacks,
but can incur high false-positive rates. As attacks are always evolving, so must detection, and this
requires updates to detection methods to detect new attacks.
3.3 Intrusion Detection Systems for Automotive Security
I investigate how researchers are applying traditional intrusion detection approaches to securing
automotive networks in this related works section. I summarize some of the cutting edge work on
automotive intrusion detection in Table 3.1 and discuss their advantages and drawbacks.
3.3.1 Message Timing
In normal vehicle operation, each message ID generated by an ECU has a regular frequency.
When attackers inject messages to execute a command to an ECU, this frequency will unexpectedly
change. Even when an attacker is injecting messages, the ECUs still send their messages period-
ically. Eventually, rate of messages on the network will be increased by a factor of more than 2
to 100 times, depending on the attacker’s injection speed. Miller and Valasek reported that they
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needed to inject at a rate of at least 20 times faster than normal for their attack to be successful [52].
Because the original ECU is still transmitting its message, an attacker needs to send in messages
at a fast enough rate to overwrite the normal message with the same ID.
Detection is based on the following principles.
1. When a new message is transmitted on the CAN bus, the IDS will check the ID and compute
the time interval from the arrival time of the latest message.
2. If the time interval of the new message is shorter than the normal model, the IDS indicates
message as an anomalous message due to this message is arriving sooner than expected.
A conceptual diagram on the effects of message injection attacks on normal traffic is given in Figure
3.1. Injected messages shorten the inter-arrival times of those specific messages.
Time (ms)
(b) Message Injection
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(a) Normal
0x01 0x02
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Figure 3.1 Diagram about transmitted messages on CAN bus on (a) normal status and
(b) under message injection attack. The time interval of message CAN ID 0x02
is shortened by the injection of attack messages.
Miller and Valasek [51] introduced a concept of analyzing the rate of messages for in-vehicle
network intrusion detection. The number of messages on CAN bus is the sum of the number of
normal messages and attack messages. By analyzing the distribution rate of messages, it should be
possible to detect anomalous messages.
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Researchers have explored utilizing message timing features for intrusion detection. These works
have shown good results in using message intervals for detecting a significant threat to automotive
security, message injection.
Gmiden et al. [21] proposed a simple intrusion detection method for CAN bus. Their proposed
algorithm does not require any modification to the CAN bus, which would mitigate changes to
the native system and computational overhead, and is based on the analysis of time intervals of
CAN messages. Their future work involves implementing and evaluating their proposed detection
method.
Moore et al. [57] proposed an anomaly detector based on the regularity of CAN message fre-
quency. Similar to the detection method proposed by Gmiden [21], Moore’s detector relies on
the time intervals of CAN messages. They observed regularity in the signal frequencies, and hy-
pothesize that a simple anomaly detection system monitoring the inter-signal wait times of CAN
bus traffic will provide accurate detection of a regular-frequency signal injection attacks. To test
their detector, they defined and executed three signal injection attacks. In their investigations
they identified that many signal injection attacks require repeated injections to be effective and
the regularity of normal signals has an exceptionally accurate anomaly detection capability. They
conclude that their approach is a promising avenue for accurate detection of an important class of
CAN bus attacks.
Song et al. [76] also proposed a lightweight intrusion detection algorithm that examines the
time interval of CAN messages. They evaluated how three different types of message injection
attacks affect the unique time interval of each CAN ID. They combined 100 one-second sample of
normal and attack data logs and then applied their IDS to determine which logs were of attacks.
They determined that the time interval is a feature capable in detecting message injection attacks
in CAN bus traffic by showing there was a clear difference between time intervals of messages in
normal status and attack status. The strength of their proposed detection algorithm is that it is
simple and efficient to use.
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Taylor et al. [80] proposed an algorithm that measures inter-packet timing over a sliding window.
Adapted from industrial control systems, the authors applied a flow based method to the CAN bus
to measure changes in the data content and their frequencies then compare them to historical
values for anomaly detection. Communications between the endpoints of the CAN networks are
contained in the flow statistics which are trained using the One Class Support Vector Machines for
flow classification. The result of this approach was evaluated using time test statistics of the flow
detector and consistent detection improvement is observed with OCSVM as the number of packet
insertions increased with time.
Tomlinson et al. [82] presents an analysis of CAN broadcasts and consequent testing of statistical
methods to detect timing changes in the CAN traffic indicative of some predicted attacks. The
detection is implemented in time-defined windows. The generation of simulated attack data, and
the determination of positive detections, are also considered.
Utilizing the CAN message timing intervals show good detection capabilities with minimal
change to the vehicle’s native network. This approach using CAN message timing features has
shown the most success in detecting known attacks. However, the methods are very simple and is
currently limited to detecting attacks that inject numerous messages onto the CAN bus. While the
majority of demonstrated attacks have been message injection, it is conceivable that other methods
of attacks exist. I examine alternative detection methods in the following sections.
3.3.2 Signature-Based
A signature-based detection method relies on signatures that describe the behavior of the system
and attacks. These behaviors of the system are described by it functionality. The monitoring of
the system involves detecting these signatures or deviations from the signature. Larson et al. [41]
proposed a specification-based attack detection approach that has a detector placed in each ECU.
The incoming and outgoing network traffic can be analyzed based on information from the protocol
stack and object directory of the CAN-protocol at the expected ECU. They show that potential
attacks can be detected from the trace of extracted information through theoretical simulation.
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The authors inferred that a likely target for attackers is the gateway ECU because a variety of
attacks can be accomplished when it is compromised.
Mitchell and Chen [53, 54, 55] proposed a behavior-rule signature based IDS for medical CPS
and unmanned aircraft systems. In their approach, they used a binary failure threshold to classify
a node as normal or malicious based on the node’s compliance threshold. Esquivel-Vargas et
al. [16] proposed an approach to automatically deploy a signature-based IDS to monitor automation
systems. They developed an approach to generate rules that represent valid device behavior in
BACnet networks that are used by the IDS to detect violations in the network traffic. This approach
was implemented in a passive way and with network- wide coverage. Fauri et al. [19] proposed an
approach to combine formal specification with anomaly-based monitoring to overcome the semantic
gap between network anomalies and actionable alerts by leveraging the lightweight logical system
specification.
3.3.3 Anomaly-Based
Researchers also explored other avenues applying intrusion detection to automotive networks
beyond the simple examination of message timing features. However, a limiting factor of imple-
menting complex intrusion detection systems is the computing power of ECUs. ECUs come in
varying complexity and sophistication from a simple seat control unit that adjusts seat height and
angle to complex engine control units that control a variety of engine functions. Some of the fol-
lowing techniques are computationally heavy and implementing them onto automotive networks
may require major rework of the automotive system.
3.3.3.1 Cyber-Physical
The following works define different ECU characteristics to authenticate individual vehicle
ECUs. Each IDS proposes using a specific characteristic that is unique to every ECU on the
vehicle. Similar to message timing anomaly detection, when these properties vary from the cap-
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tured normal, an anomaly is detected. The works here describe alternative features to message
timing that can be captured and examined to detect certain attacks.
Cho and Shin [12] introduced a clock-based IDS that uses clock skew (timing error) to authen-
ticate ECUs. The IDS records communications on the CAN bus and creates fingerprints of every
ECU on the network. Each ECU is assigned a fingerprint based on their specific clock skew and this
is used to distinguish them. The authors proposed that by analyzing the CPU clocks behaviors,
spoofing attacks can be detected in the network.
Ji et al. [30] investigates a detection method based on clock drift. Their approach considers that
every ECU has a fixed clock skew and it is possible to establish a normal model of ECU’s clock
behaviors to detect abnormal measurements. They evaluate the effectiveness of the method against
injection and suspension attacks. The analysis results demonstrated that the proposed detection
method can detect small-scale change of packets transmitted in CAN networks.
Choi et al. [13] proposed a novel automotive intrusion detection system, VoltageIDS. This system
leverages the electrical CAN signal characteristics as a fingerprint of the ECUs. The VoltageIDS
does not require any modification of the vehicular system and can distinguish between errors and
bus-off attacks. They evaluated their IDS on moving as well as idling vehicles. The method is
shown to be capable of detecting the recently introduced bus-off attack.
Lee et al. [42] proposed an IDS called OTIDS that measures the response performance of network
nodes based on the offset ratio and the time interval between request and response. The authors
claimed that each node has a fixed response offset ratio and time interval in a normal operation
mode which varies significantly during attack. This difference in the offset ratio and time intervals
is used to detect attacks in the network.
3.3.3.2 Entropy
Entropy-based intrusion detection has been applied to traditional network-based systems, but
typically has a high rate of false positives [59] due to typical traffic variance. As automotive network
traffic tends to be more periodic, entropy-based detection has been shown it can detect anomalies
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with a low rate of false-positives. Müter et al. [59], using data recorded from the in-vehicle network
communication during normal operation, calculated the Shannon entropy value. Deviations from
that entropy are identified as potential intrusions. Marchetti et al. [47] proposed an entropy-based
algorithm for detecting anomalies in CAN messages in an unmodified vehicle. They conducted
extensive evaluations based on several hours of CAN traffic captured during driving sessions on
public motorways. Their experimental evaluations show that entropy-based anomaly detectors are
a viable approach for identifying CAN bus anomalies caused by attackers injecting messages.
3.3.3.3 Message Rate
Very similar to the message timing detection, Hoppe et al. [27] proposed an anomaly-based IDS
that is placed on the CAN bus so that it can listen to network traffic. Their IDS examines the
rate of transmission of specific messages and compares it to what is normal to detect additional
or missing messages. This approach differs from the previously examined works as it counts rate
of transmission of packets as opposed to the timing intervals of the packets. Deviations from the
expected normal number of messages transmitted are identified as anomalies. Their future work
involves implementing and evaluating their proposed detection method.
3.3.3.4 CAN-Fields
Several works utilize the makeup and data fields of CAN messages for anomaly detection.
Matsumoto et al. [50] proposed a method of preventing unauthorized data transmission in CAN.
Each ECU monitors all the data on the bus, and broadcasts an error message if it recognizes spoofed
messages with its own ID, before the unauthorized message is completely transmitted. Boudguiga
et al. [89] proposed an intrusion detection method that makes each legitimate ECU monitor the data
frames on the CAN bus to detect whether another ECU is sending frame on its behalf. The authors
used a hardware security module, a security processor dedicated to cryptographic computation and
secure key storage, in the ECU to enforce security in the CAN bus.
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Van Herrewege et al. [84] suggested adding message authentication protocol to the CAN mes-
sages. They showed that the standard authentication protocols are not suitable to the CAN bus,
and presented CANAuth. This is a new backward compatible and lightweight message authenti-
cation protocol for the CAN bus. However, this required all ECUs to know a pre-shared key to be
able to verify messages.
Taylor et al. [81] proposed an anomaly detector using Long Short-Term Memory recurrent neural
network for CAN bus anomaly detection. This approach trained the neural network to predict the
payload of the next message. The prediction errors are then used as signals for identifying anomalies
in the messages sequence.
Martinelli et al. [49] proposed a detection method to identify attacks on CAN packets using
fuzzy classification algorithms. The authors developed a fuzzy rough nearest neighbor classification
technique to classify legitimate CAN messages generated by the human driver and the injected
ones. Kuwahara et al. [39] proposed a statistical anomaly detection approach based on supervised
and unsupervised learning of message patterns. The authors assume that there is likely a malicious
message in a sequence if the number of messages is higher than normal.
Markovitz et al. [48] proposed a novel domain-aware anomaly detection system for CAN bus
traffic. They discovered semantically meaningful fields through the inspection of real CAN traffic.
They developed a greedy algorithm to split CAN messages into fields and classify these fields into
specific types they observed. Their anomaly detection system uses classifiers to characterize the
fields and build a model for the messages, based on their field types in the learning phase. In the
enforcement phase, the system detects deviations from the model. They evaluated their system
on simulated and real CAN traffic and achieved near zero false positives. These methods require
a deeper understanding of CAN messages and reverse engineering of the messages and their data
fields.
Tyree et al. [83] present a transformational approach to CAN IDS that exploits the geometric
properties of CAN data to inform two novel detectors, one based on distance from a learned, lower
dimensional manifold and the other on discontinuities of the manifold over time. Proof-of-concept
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tests are presented by implementing a potential attack approach on a driving vehicle. The initial
results suggest that (1) the first detector requires additional refinement but does hold promise; (2)
the second detector gives a clear, strong indicator of the attack; and (3) the algorithms keep pace
with high-speed CAN messages. As their approach is data-driven it provides a vehicle-agnostic IDS
that eliminates the need to reverse engineer CAN messages and can be ported to an after-market
plugin.
3.3.4 Other Works
Müter et al. [60] introduced an approach for anomaly detection using sensors to recognize attacks
on in-vehicle networks during normal vehicle operation. The authors discussed the design and the
application criteria for attack detection in the network, especially the CAN bus, without causing
false positives. This detection scheme consists of eight sensors for detecting an attack. The sensors
serve as a criteria for recognizing a threat to the automobile by monitoring different aspects of the
network. In their proposed approach, the applicability of these sensors is based on different criteria
such as the type and number of messages, the number of buses they need to access, and if the
payload of the message needs inspection. The authors showed sensor data results can be evaluated
and how to integrate the approach into an holistic IDS concept.
Kang and Kang [32] proposed a machine learning based IDS approach using deep neural network
structure to monitor CAN packets. Their IDS consists of two modules. A monitoring module that
decides a type of CAN packet based on trained features of known attacks. Once the monitoring
module identifies a new attack, a profiling module records the attack model and updates the system
for an upcoming packet. These two modules would be embedded in each ECU to analyze CAN
packets. They used an unsupervised Deep Belief Net to capture underlying statistical features
of CAN data and used them to classify messages as benign or anomalous. They reported a 99
percent detection ratio while keeping false positives under 1 to 2 percent through the use of software
simulation. However, the authors did not discuss the overhead to implement their machine learning
approach on modern vehicles.
25
Studnia et al. [77] proposed a language based IDS that uses language theory to define a set
of attack signatures from an ECU behavioral model. This idea involves automatic generation of
forbidden sequences from patterns characterizing the expected behavior of ECU based on language
theory. Formal language is used here to describe a set of attacks which vehicles may be subjected
to. This approach describes an algorithm that can be used to overcome the excessive use of memory
which may be necessitated by an increase in states caused by the language.
These works show that there are multiple CAN and vehicle ECU characteristics that can be
leveraged for intrusion detection in vehicles. Some works [12, 30, 13] capture specific characteristics
without requiring changes to the native vehicular system to detect attacks. There are works [50,
48, 3, 23] that require reverse engineering of the CAN system and its messages to implement an
intrusion detection system. While it is difficult to determine whether which approach is better,
as some have not been evaluated, the best approach to detect the most comprehensive range of
attacks may be a combination of some of these works.
The prior research in automotive security lacks a unified notion of anomalies and baselines. I
have attempted to clarify and unify the concepts of anomalies and intrusion detection regarding
automotive security. This begins with identifying threat models and threats that effect all vehicles
and not just one specific model. From a technical perspective, IDSs can work well for detecting
intrusions on the CAN bus. Different implementations of anomaly detection methods can detect
different types of anomalies. Current approaches have a focus on message injection attack detection
because it is the main attack vector for hackers trying to manipulate a vehicle to misbehave. The
link to the next step after detection is to enable prevention; an effective IDS for cyber-physical
systems should have an active response to cyberattacks.
As research in this field continues to progress, so will the attackers and their attacks. This
progression requires continual updates to threat models to identify new vulnerabilities and attacks,
and subsequent adjustments to IDS to counter them. The fundamental issue remains that CAN,
while inherently insecure is a modern day vehicle standard, exemplifying the need for security
should be addressed throughout the design process.
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Table 3.1 Comparison of Proposed IDSs for In-Vehicle Networks
Detection Feature Proposed System Intrusions Detected Evaluation
Message Frequency Miller and Valasek (2016) [51] Message Injection Live Road Tests
Hoppe (2008) [27] Message Injection and Deletion Testbench Simulation
Message Interval Gmiden (2016) [21] N/A No Evaluation
Song (2016) [76] Message Injection Live Road Tests
Moore (2017) [57] Message Injection Real Vehicle Simulation
Signatures Larson (2008) [41] Known Attacks with Defined Signatures Theoretical Simulation
Cyber-Physical Cho and Shin (2016) [12] Spoofing Real Vehicle Simulation
Ji (2018) [30] Injection and Suspension Attacks Testbench Simulation
Choi (2018) [13] Bus-Off Attack Real Vehicle Simulation
Entropy Marchetti (2016) [47] Message Injection Real Vehicle Simulation
Müter (2011) [59] Various Attacks that Effect System Entropy Real Vehicle Simulation
CAN Fields Matsumoto (2012) [50] Message Spoofing No Evaluation
Markovitz (2017) [48] N/A Real and Simulated CAN Traffic
Sensor Data Müter (2010) [60] Message Injection No Evaluation
Deep Neural Network Kang and Kang (2016) [32] Attacks Based off Statistical Features SW Simulation with OCTANE
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CHAPTER 4. OUR APPROACH TOWARDS AUTOMOTIVE INTRUSION
DETECTION
I showed that numerous works utilize CAN message timing intervals for intrusion detection [76,
57]. In this section of the paper, I present my adaptation of current methods, their limitations, and
how I improved upon current methods while developing a new anomaly detection method.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the performance of an anomaly detector based on message timing
features. The key idea of this detection approach is to model CAN message timings for every
message ID to describe normal vehicle behavior. The goal is to design a detector that detects
changes in message timing from normal as an indicator of an anomaly.
This chapter examines the performance of different message timing based anomaly detectors. I
evaluate the effectiveness of my approach using real-world CAN data. The main contributions of
this chapter are:
1. I investigate multiple message timing features and model normal CAN message timings using
message interval and frequency.
2. I develop an intrusion detector based on message frequencies across different driving modes.
The model characterizes message timings for detecting message injection attacks.
3. I prototype and evaluate the performance of the detection system using simulated CAN logs
and logs generated from a real vehicle.
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4.2 Message Timing Detection
I investigate the most common type of attack, message injection, in this paper. The attack can
take control of a vehicle’s driving operations. The basic idea is that an attacker transmits a packet
with the same ID as a legitimate packet as soon as the legitimate packet is transmitted. This will
cause the other ECUs on the CAN bus to use the data from the attacker instead of the legitimate
one. Even when an attacker is injecting messages, the ECUs still send their messages periodically.
Eventually, the rate of messages on the network will be increased by a factor of more than 2 to 100
times, depending on the attacker’s injection speed. Miller and Valasek reported that they needed
to inject at a rate of at least 20 times faster than normal for their attack to be successful [52].
Because the original ECU is still transmitting its message, an attacker needs to send messages at
a fast enough to overwrite the normal message with the same ID.
Detection is based on the following two principles.
1. When a new message is transmitted on the CAN bus, the IDS will check the CAN ID and
compute the time interval from the arrival time of the latest message with the same CAN ID.
2. If the time interval of the new message is shorter than the normal model, the IDS indicates
new message as an anomalous message since this message is arriving sooner than expected.
These detection principles are possible due to the predictable periodic nature of CAN. A conceptual
diagram on the effects of message injection attacks on normal traffic is given in Figure 3.1.
The detection process is detailed in Figure 4.1. Every CAN message is read and its ID captured.
The time interval from current to previous message with the same ID is calculated and compared to
the normal model timing interval for that message. If the interval time is less than normal, the IDS
will indicate an anomaly and the IDS sends an alert. The anomaly detector usually has two modes
- one mode to capture the normal timing intervals for every CAN message and another intrusion
detection mode that observes current CAN traffic and compares its message timings to the normal
model to detect anomalies. To train the normal model, a few seconds of normal, no anomalies CAN
traffic, is used to train the IDS. For each CAN ID, the IDS will calculate the interval time that is
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defined as the difference from the previous message time to the current message time, as shown in
Equation (4.1). The average interval time is determined in Equation (4.2).
∆1 = t1 − t0, ..,∆n = tn − tn−1 (4.1)
µ = (
n∑
i=1
∆i)/n (4.2)
My normal model consists of the average message interval times for every CAN ID. Anomalous
messages are detected when the interval time is less than the normal time. Shorter interval times
indicate additional messages on the bus.
4.3 Message Interval Evaluation
To demonstrate the utilization of message intervals as the detection feature, the traffic capture
of normal operation of two test vehicles was analyzed and the normal message interval timings
for all CAN messages were calculated. The data set for our first test vehicle is the live vehicle
capture data published by Miller and Valasek [51]. This data set contained the CAN traffic of their
test vehicle during normal operations. The message injection attacks are simulated by injecting
specific messages to create data sets of malicious CAN traffic. During simulations, I can control the
rate of injection to allow multi-rate injection attacks and evaluation of the various injection rates.
Read CAN 
Frame
Check Message 
ID
Calculate 
Interval Time
Analyze Next 
CAN Frame
Alert IDS
If Interval 
< Normal 
Model 
Interval
Else
True
Figure 4.1 Every CAN message is read and its ID captured. The time interval from
current to previous message with the same ID is calculated and compared to
the normal model timing interval for that message. If the interval time is less
than normal, the IDS will indicate an anomaly and the IDS sends an alert.
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Additionally, I simulate single CAN ID injection along with multiple CAN message ID injection at
multiple rates. Figure 4.2 illustrates the message injection on the message time interval.
Normal
Attack
Figure 4.2 Demonstrating message injection attacks affecting the timings of messages. The
simulated attack messages have fluctuating message timings and are shorter
than normal depending on rate of injection.
To evaluate the IDS based on constant interval timings, the IDS is trained with normal operation
CAN traffic to build a normal model for all CAN message interval timings. Each of our vehicle data
sets had over 100 different CAN IDs. Then I applied this IDS against the simulated data sets of
message injection attacks. It was tested against multiple rates of injection: 2, 5, and 20 times faster
than normal values. It was reported that at least 20 faster rate was required for successful attack,
but I tested for slower rates because it had been demonstrated it is possible to have a successful
attack if rate of injection was 2 times faster, depending on vehicle and type of attack.
Table 4.1 reports the detection accuracy and false positive rates across the variety of message
injection speeds and attacks. Detection accuracy is defined as the number of CAN messages that
were correctly identified as having anomalous timings and the false positive rate is the number
of incorrectly identified CAN ID messages out of the total messages. The results show that the
faster the rate of injection, the higher the detection rate of anomalies. The false positive rate varies
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Table 4.1 Detection Accuracy for Single and Multiple CAN ID Injection Attacks
Attack
Type
Message
ID
Injection
Speed
Detection
Accuracy
False
Positive
Single
Message
Injection
0440
2× 75% 0%
5× 94% 11%
20× 99% 5%
Multiple
Message
Injection
0440
and
03D3
2× 0440: 75% 0%
03D3: 68.75% 0%
5× 0440: 94% 0%
03D3: 97.5% 0%
20× 0440: 99.5% 6.6%
03D3: 99.4% 6.6%
depending on the rate of message injection and which messages get overwritten by the injected
messages. There is an increase of false positives in both 5 and 20 times injection speeds, however
it is seen that the false positives is higher in 5 times faster injection. This can be explained by
how false positives is defined, when a message has anomalous timings but was not being injected,
this is a false positive message. However, when an attacker is injecting messages, depending on
which messages are being over written, this can increase or decrease the false positive rate because
different messages have different sensitivity in timings. A message that is transmitted often has
timing that is not as affected by message injection, however if a message that is rarely transmitted
and misses a transmission, then this greatly alters the timing of said message.
The data set for the second test vehicle was obtained from a vehicle at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. The data set was constructed by logging CAN traffic through the ODB-II port of a
real sedan while driving on a dynamometer system. The dynamometer system simulates real road
operation. Attacks were performed by injection malicious messages at high rate to override normal
vehicle operations. The malicious messages were constructed by sniffing and spoofing legitimate
messages transmitted on the bus. I discovered there were two major issues in the message timing
intervals for this second test vehicle.
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1. There were several messages that demonstrated multiple timing intervals. It was assumed
that CAN messages have a singular consistent message interval. Numerous previous works
stated that all CAN messages have consistent timing intervals [9, 57, 52, 7].
2. A few CAN messages had message timing intervals vary depending on the vehicle’s behavior.
I expected some variation in the interval but the change that was seen was at times greater
than twice the normal rate.
When the IDS was applied to the data set from vehicle 2, it generated 30 percent false positives, with
41 other message IDs detected as anomalous. These poor results were caused by the inconsistencies
in the message timing intervals.
Figure 4.3 These plots depict the varying message intervals seen by multiple CAN mes-
sages. Some CAN messages show multiple distinct intervals while some vary
due to changes in vehicle operations.
For example, in the CAN data set for the second test vehicle, several CAN messages showed
non-periodic and multiple timing intervals. Figure 4.3 illustrates that multiple CAN IDs have
varying message intervals. The data set for vehicle 2 had 137 different CAN messages, and about
30 of these messages showed the inconsistencies in the message timing intervals. The differences in
CAN message timing behavior and required injection attack rates between the test vehicles may
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indicated that CAN may differ depending on manufacturer and vehicle. This inconsistent behavior
is problematic for anomaly detection algorithms based on the assumption of constant message
timing intervals.
4.4 Message Frequency Detection
To address the aforementioned problem, it had been observed that the frequency of the messages
remained relatively consistent, even while the CAN message intervals varied. Additionally, I noticed
that the number of messages stays consistent even as the vehicle changes modes of operation. Thus,
it was hypothesized the rate of messages is a better indicator for anomaly detection compared to
message interval.
I proposed an anomaly detection method based on the message frequency - frequency (f ) is
equal to the rate of messages (m) transmitted in a set time interval (t) - as shown in Equation
(f=m/t). When the frequency of messages increases by a factor of more than twice the normal
value, an anomaly is indicated. As reported earlier, for an attack to be successful, the rate of
injection must be at least twice the normal value. I implemented the frequency-based algorithm
in our IDS. The IDS obtains a normal model for every CAN ID with the use of a few seconds of
training data. The IDS then scans current CAN traffic and calculates the frequency of messages
for every CAN ID. If the frequency of messages deviates at a rate of greater than 2 times normal,
the IDS will indicate an anomaly for said CAN ID.
It should be noted that this approach is relatively simple in complexity as to be implemented
in a simple ODB-II dongle. The dongle is likely to connect to the vehicle’s OBD port and acts as
an additional ECU on the bus. In addition, this proposed method is cost-effective since it does not
require any modification to the native CAN bus.
4.4.1 Vehicle Modes of Operation
I examined the two causes of false positives and message timing irregularities: 1) Vehicle mode
of operation and 2) CAN message behavior. CAN message timing intervals were affected by normal
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Table 4.2 Different Driving Modes Message Count
Driving Mode Time Duration (Seconds)
Message Rate
(Msgs/Sec)
Key ON 10 4448
Key ON to Start 10 4432
Shift to Reverse 15 4356
Accelerate Reverse 10 4351
Decelerate Reverse 10 4353
Shift to Drive 10 4352
Accelerate 15 4413
Maintain Speed 10 4513
changes in the vehicle and generated false positives in anomaly detection. I chose to use message
frequency as opposed to message interval to handle these normal behaviors and changes in the
vehicle and vehicles themselves.
As the vehicle changed modes of operation, Table 4.2 shows the rate of messages varies at a rate
less than 20 percent. The vehicle had an average transmission rate of 4402 messages per second
through all modes of operation. It was demonstrated that a successful message injection attack
will increase the rate of the injected message by more than a factor of 2. Therefore, the variability
in rate of messages during normal operation is negligible when compared to the change caused by
injection attacks.
Additionally, I examined the messages that had varying message intervals. As discussed above,
the timing intervals of these messages demonstrate inconsistent behavior. There are certain points
where the interval doubles its normal or there are multiple intervals. However, the frequency of
these messages never varies more than 20 percent. This variation is within normal parameters. The
dips in message rate may be attributed to the delay caused by higher priority messages on the bus
as the vehicle is in operation and are not indicative of malicious anomalies.
4.4.2 Message Injection Attack
Knowing that during a message injection attack, the number of messages will increase and
therefore the frequency of certain messages will increase. To demonstrate the change in frequency
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during a message injection attack, I simulated an injection attack with the backup light message
with ID of 202. Logging the CAN traffic of the test vehicle as it was driving on a dynamometer to
simulate real road driving. The attacks were simulated by injecting malicious messages at a high
enough rate to override the normal vehicle operations through the OBD-II port. It required a rate
of at least 2 times faster than normal for the desired attack to be successful, as in the backup light
turned on.
Figure 4.4 shows the captured normal traffic is represented in the blue. The frequency of this
particular message was 200 messages per second. The captured message frequency when injecting
messages is represented in red. Starting with 15 seconds of normal traffic, then injected messages
for 15 seconds at a 2 times faster rate. Repeated this procedure of 15 seconds of normal traffic,
followed by 15 seconds of attack traffic. Figure 4.4 shows that the frequency of messages doubles
to 400 message per second when wmessages are injected.
Figure 4.4 A comparison of the effect message injection attack has on the interval and
frequency of CAN ID: 0x202. Blue is normal operation and Red is attack
traffic. Left: Injection attack alters the interval of messages by shortening
them. Right: It is clear when the message injection attack is occurring. The
frequency doubles in rate during attacks.
Evaluating the message frequency-based IDS against the message injection attack for both test
vehicles. Using normal traffic data as the training data, I captured the normal frequency for every
CAN ID. The IDS then compared current captured traffic and calculated the frequency for every
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message. If the frequency increased by more than 50 percent, an anomaly was indicated. The results
are summarized in Table 4.3 that shows the frequency-based detection has better detection rates
and maintains low rates of false positives compared to current interval-based detection approaches.
Table 4.3 Frequency Analysis of Message Injection Attack
Vehicle Attack Type Detection Type Detection Accuracy False Positive
1 Message Injection
Interval 75% 0%
Frequency 100% 0.7%
2 Message Injection
Interval 96.9% 30%
Frequency 100% 1.4%
Moore et al. Message Injection Interval 99.9% 0.29%
Seo et al. Message Injection Generative Adversarial Nets 96.5% 3.8%
Kang et al. Message Injection Deep Neural Network 97.8% 1.6%
I showed that the basic premise that all CAN messages have consistent timing intervals across
different vehicles and modes is not always true. Thus, IDS approaches based on constant timing
intervals are not reliable. I propose to address these issues with frequency based approaches. I
showed my method can resolve the issues encountered by interval-based approaches and reduces
false positive. Besides just detecting message injection attacks, the approach is able to handle
timing variations from normal driving behavior and can be implemented on multiple vehicles. The
method is light-weight as it does not require changes to the native CAN.
4.4.3 Frequency Analysis with Fourier Transform
I also performed a frequency domain analysis to assess the frequency components of the time
series CAN data. If the CAN messages have a constant frequency, it should show a singular
peak in the frequency domain. This frequency should change during an attack if it affects the
CAN message transmission rates. The discrete Fourier transform is used to convert a sequence of
discrete-time data to discrete data in the frequency domain. The Fast Fourier Transform is often
used in completing a discrete Fourier transform.
The equations for Fourier Transform are given below, Equation 4.3 and 4.4. Fourier Transform
takes a time-based pattern, measures every possible cycle, and then returns the overall cycles that
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make up a signal. In this case, a Fourier Transform takes the CAN message signals and finds the
speeds, amplitudes, and phases of each individual CAN message.
Xk =
N−1∑
n=0
xn ∗ e−i2π∗kn/N (4.3)
xn = 1/N
N−1∑
k=0
Xk ∗ ei2π∗kn/N (4.4)
Equation 4.3, adds up all the time spikes from a CAN message signal to determine the frequency of
the message. Equation 4.4, determines the time point by adding up each frequency. I am breaking
down the transmission signal of the CAN messages into time spikes.
The time series data for test vehicle 2 was converted into the frequency domain with the Fast
Fourier Transform and investigated the effects of different driving modes and message injection
attacks. Some data processing was needed to get the discrete CAN time signals into a state
which could apply the Fourier Transform. The CAN time stamps were converted into a periodic
square wave. The signal was held high during transmission of the specific CAN message and low
when the message was not transmitting. The sampling frequency was (fs) as fs = D/t with the
number of data points (D) and the time interval (t). In the datasets, the amount of data points
varies depending on the CAN message. Typically, it had anywhere from 2000 to 8000 data points
depending on CAN message in the logs. With the timing interval, its average sampling frequency
for CAN messages was 200 samples per second. One limitation in using the FFT function is that
the number of data points must be a number that is a power of two. Some of the samples were
padded with zeros to meet this requirement.
Converting the time series data into periodic square waves allowed us to apply FFT to the
data. I chose this representation of the data to simulate the transmission and hold times of each
CAN message being transmitted on the bus. However, perfect square waves with equal magnitude
correspond to a FFT output with multiple frequency peaks. Figure 4.5 shows that a square wave
decomposes into multiple sine waves at varying magnitudes. Messages that have a single consistent
message interval showed this ideal FFT behavior. However, messages that demonstrated multiple
timing intervals had more complicated FFT output, as seen in Figure 4.6. It shows that multiple
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Figure 4.5 Left plot depicts an ideal square wave, which is representative our converted
CAN message data. The messages get transmitted at a fixed interval and have
a certain transmission time represented by the duty cycle of the wave. The
right plot shows the Fourier transform of the square wave.
factors of CAN messages may affect the output of the Fourier Transform, including rate of trans-
mission, interval behavior of messages, changes in driving mode, and normal variations in normal
timing.
To conduct a frequency analysis against an attack, the same injection data from vehicle 2 was
used. During a message injection attack, the frequency of messages is increased. However, it was
observed during an attack, the frequency peaks stayed at the same frequencies while the magnitude
of the peaks changed. An attack is just a duplication of the normal message signal but with a phase
shift. Examining the frequency plots of normal and attack traffic in Figure 4.7, the magnitude of
the frequencies are increased in the attack as there is now an an additional attack signal.
Additionally, I created a spectrogram as a visual representation of the frequencies as they vary
of time. Creating a spectrogram using FFT is a digital process. By digitally sampling the data, in
the time domain, the data is split into chunks and Fourier transformed to calculate the magnitude
of the frequency spectrum for each chunk. Each chunk corresponds to a vertical line in the image.
By examining the normal and attack plots, it can be seen that the lower frequency ranges, 200 and
500 Hz, seem to lose strength during an attack.
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Figure 4.6 On the left side there are two example plots of CAN messages with irregular
timing intervals. The right side shows their respective FFT outputs
These results open the possibility that frequency domain analysis is able to discern hidden
features that are not present in simple timing analysis. Further investigation is needed to determine
the applicability of frequency domain analysis towards intrusion detection.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, I presented an anomaly intrusion detection system to identify message injection
attacks on the CAN bus. The approach is based on modeling CAN message timings using message
intervals and frequency to detect timing changes and intrusions in the CAN bus. Experimental
results have shown that the detection system can efficiently detect injection attacks with high
detection accuracy.
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Figure 4.7 These plots show the change in the input signal and FFT output during a
message injection attack. It can be seen as the message rate doubles, the
magnitudes of the frequency peaks increase. The increase in magnitude is
caused by the doubling of singles with the same frequency.
Figure 4.8 Spectrogram Plots. Left side plots normal message signal, and the right side
plots a 2x message rate injection attack.
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CHAPTER 5. HYBRID AUTOMOTIVE INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEM
This chapter introduces a novel intrusion detection system called HAIDS. This stands for Hybrid
Automotive Intrusion Detection System, an IDS that uses both anomaly and signature based
detection. A limitation of my anomaly detector is its limited ability to only detect attacks that
alter CAN message timing. In traditional network security, different anomaly detection approaches
are combined together to form a combinational system that provides increased attack coverage.
Building on this idea and propose a hybrid automotive intrusion detection system that combines
anomaly with signature based detectors. Portions of this chapter have been published in [95].
The contributions of this chapter are:
1. An anomaly detector that models CAN message timings to detect anomalies in the CAN
message traffic.
2. A signature detector that complements the anomaly detector. This detector uses different
observers to detect attack signatures observed on the CAN bus.
3. A hybrid automotive intrusion detection system that combines the anomaly detector and
signature detector to detect various types of attacks and intrusions.
4. Evaluation and comparison of HAIDS against different types of anomaly detection using real
CAN logs generated from sedan vehicles.
5.1 Anomaly Detector
This detection method is used to detect new and previously unknown attacks by capturing a
normal model of the system and identifying variances from normal. However this method can suffer
from high rates of false positives. As having demonstrated with the message timing-based anomaly
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detector, it can detect new attacks that affect CAN message timings, but can suffer from false
positives. This type of detector will provide attack coverage of attacks that have not been defined
by signatures. To supplement and increase detection accuracy, I propose combining the anomaly
detector with a signature-based detector.
5.2 Signature Detector
Signature-based intrusion detection has been shown to be effective in detecting known attacks
with high true positive rates while maintaining near zero false positives. This detector works with
a knowledge base of signatures or rules that it scans the system for. When the detector identifies a
signature, it will alert an anomaly. However, this type of detection mechanism is unable to detect
any anomalies outside of the pre-defined database of attack signatures. Thus, by combining it with
anomaly detection, HAIDS will be able to detect both unknown and known attacks. I propose
using behavior-based detection techniques to identify anomalies difficult to detect using anomaly
detection. These anomalies do not alter message timings, and as such will be missed by the message
timing-based detector. I divide behavior-based signature detection into two classes.
5.2.1 Event-based Observers
Classifying these observers to detect point anomalies, which do not have a sense of time, and are
typically binary in character (True or False). An example of a rule would be defining a characteristic
of a vehicle, such as engine temperature, and if the characteristic’s value falls outside a certain range,
then an intrusion is indicated. While some of these rules will apply to all vehicles, the multitude
of options in vehicles makes it difficult to predict what rules will apply to which vehicles. This
complexity of vehicles means the rules will need to be tailored for every vehicle make and model.
I try to focus on universal vehicle characteristics in creating the rules for the signature detector.
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5.2.2 Context-based Observers
These observers can detect contextual and collective anomalies by taking in multiple inputs.
Contextual anomalies are anomalies that occur in the context of a given scenario that by themselves
are not considered an anomaly, but given certain circumstances are anomalous. Collective anomalies
are multiple events that are not anomalies individually but when they occur together are anomalous.
These detectors look into the past to determine what is occurring and predict what should happen.
The more up-to-date, specific, and well-defined the rules are, the greater detection rate and
accuracy, while maintaining low false positives. It must be acknowledged that there is still much
unknown in regards to signature detection. Vehicles have unique CAN signals, rule set need to be
defined to separate acceptable driver behavior from attack behavior. As I delve deeper into the
attack and threat models, the rule generation will continue to develop to better detect and classify
intrusions.
5.3 Multiple Detection Approach
Our IDS uses multiple detectors to detect different types of intrusions. The use of timing-based
detection will detect anything anomalous effecting message timings on the CAN bus, whether they
be a true anomaly or not. The behavior-based intrusion detection will provide accurate detection
of attacks that have been pre-defined into the rule database. The goal is to use multiple signature
detectors to detect a variety of intrusions that have been identified, creating a comprehensive
intrusion detection system.
These three components: timing signatures, behavior signatures, and logs of CAN traffic, work
together to form our IDS as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The aim is to show that a multi-faceted
detection system is better than any singular solution in detecting a wider range of anomalies. The
goal is to use the IDS to mitigate the vulnerabilities of CAN. While we cannot change the topology
of CAN, our IDS identifies anomalous packets even without message authenticators. Due to the
unencrypted nature of CAN, its messages can be sniffed and spoofed. The IDS aims to identify these
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Figure 5.1 Automotive Intrusion Detection System
spoofed messages by detecting message injection. The strength of our security IDS is dependent
on its detection efficiency and attack coverage, which is evaluated in the following section.
5.4 Evaluation
I propose and describe an evaluation criterion for our IDS to illustrate its effectiveness and
performance of each component individually and combined.
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5.4.1 Evaluation Setup
The IDS analyzes traffic capture during normal operation, starting with the live vehicle capture
published by Miller and Valasek, to calculate the normal message timings for every CAN message
ID. Next simulating a message injection attack by adding injected messages into a normal traffic
capture. Simulating multiple injection attacks, from single and multiple CAN ID injection to
specific messages specified by their CAN IDs. HAIDS would calculate and compare the current
messages timings for every CAN message ID. If current message rate varied outside a range from
normal, an intrusion is declared and logged. I had a second dataset from Oak Ridge National Labs.
They captured normal driving and injection attack data from a live vehicle in a lab. The results of
the anomaly detector are presented in sections 7 and 8.
To simulate the attack signatures for the signature detector, I utilized the data set from Miller
and Valasek. They had reversed engineered the CAN IDs to correspond to their respective vehicle
operations. Using this knowledge to create data sets that simulated the desired attacks. I created
two attack data sets to simulate diagnostic message injection and the denominational attack of
vehicle accelerating and car door opening.
5.4.2 Signature Anomaly Detection
To evaluate event-based signature anomaly detection, the initial step is to define the rules
that guide observers in recognizing anomalies. I identify which CAN packets are important for
detection and what they do in a vehicle. In addition, besides just identifying anomalies, I also
identify sequential anomalies. Knowing that diagnostic message should not occur during normal
operation, so checking that none of the packets had message ID of 07, which indicates a diagnostic
message, to evaluate the event-based observers. The IDS had 100 percent accuracy in detecting
event-based attacks that was injected during evaluation. To evaluate the context-based observers,
I defined anomalies in this category. Deciding that vehicle doors should not open while vehicle is
accelerating. I combined the detection methods to identify the signatures of car door opening and
acceleration. The CAN IDs for both actions were identified and when they occurred together, this
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as determined to be anomalous. The IDS was successful in detecting when the door opened while
the car was accelerating. The signature detector was perfect in its detection and with zero false
positives. This is due to the fact that detection is trivial given appropriate signature definition. As
further exploration of the threat model, and as attacks develop, researchers will be able to generate
more attack signatures, further enhancing event-based observers. Other possible attack signatures
could include: limits on top speed, rapid changes in steering wheel angle, and other vehicle metrics.
5.4.3 Hybrid Anomaly Detection
My hybrid intrusion detection system stands out due to how it integrates anomaly detection
with signature detection. HAIDS goes beyond just using different detection approaches separately,
it feeds the results from the anomaly detector into the signature detector so that it can differentiate
anomalies from intrusions. There are anomalies that occur in systems normally, by combining the
detectors, it can identify when these anomalies are malicious and classify as intrusions.
I had reported earlier that the anomaly detector based on message timings struggles with
messages that are not consistently periodic, and this behavior has multiple causes. These inconsis-
tencies caused false positives in our anomaly detection. However, because I was able to determine
the causes of some of these irregularities and attack features, it is possible to write signatures to
wrap around the anomaly detector. This reduces the false positives from normal anomalies and is
better able to identify intrusions, as seen in 5.1.
The difference between normal system anomalies versus malicious message injection anomalies
lies in the difference in message behavior. While both alter message timing features, attacks have
a defined duration of messages with altered timings. While a normal system anomaly will alter
some message timings irregularly. An attacker needs to inject messages for a minimum duration
and rate for the vehicle to behave maliciously. Knowing this fact, the signature detector is able to
look for multiple and a series of anomalies to determine when an anomaly is an intrusion. Also by
ignoring normal system anomalies, this is able to decrease the false positive rate of the anomaly
detector without decreasing accuracy of detecting intrusions.
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Table 5.1 HAIDS
IDS
Detection
Accuracy
False
Positive
Frequency 98.945% 40.58%
HAIDS 100% 1.4%
HAIDS uses the anomaly detector to detect any anomalous timings that alter the frequency of
CAN messages, the signature detector is able to determine which of these anomalies are intrusions.
By defining certain attacker intrusion characteristics that HAIDS will look for when examining the
anomalies detected to identify attacks. This system is unique in how each detector complements
each other by working together to detect attacks.
5.4.4 Implementation
The plan is to implement the hybrid intrusion detection system as a hardware security module,
such as a OBD-II dongle that directly interfaces with the in-vehicle network. OBD port is standard
in all modern vehicles, this ensures compatibility of the solution to a wide range of vehicles, while
minimizing changes to the in-vehicle network. HAIDS acts as another ECU on the CAN bus, and
therefore receives all messages transmitted on the bus. HAIDS can then monitor and analyze all
traffic to detect any anomalies.
5.4.5 Summary
In summary, I present HAIDS, an approach for detecting intrusion in in-vehicle networks using
a combination of anomaly and signature detection. The anomaly detection is developed through
observing message timings and creating a normal model of message frequencies. Detection of
anomalies is achieved when an attack alters these frequencies. The signature detection is based
on a variety of different signatures captured by our observers. The key strength to the approach
is that by combining different detection approaches, creates a more thorough and comprehensive
detector.
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CHAPTER 6. MACHINE LEARNING TOWARDS REVERSE
ENGINEERING CAN MESSAGES
In this chapter, I present work that focuses on the reverse engineering and classification of CAN
messages. The problem is that even though CAN is standardized, the implementation may vary for
different manufacturers and vehicle models. These implementations are kept secret, therefore CAN
messages for every vehicle needs to be analyzed and reverse engineered in order to get information.
Due to the lack of publicly available CAN specifications, attackers and researchers need to reverse
engineer messages to pinpoint which messages will have the desired impact. The reverse engineering
process is needed by researchers and hackers for all manufacturers and their respective vehicles to
understand what the vehicle is doing and what each CAN messages means. The knowledge of the
specifications of CAN messages can improve the effectiveness of security mechanisms applied to
CAN.
6.1 Background
This section introduces a high-level description of reverse engineering and machine learning as
applied towards the controller area network.
6.1.1 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering CAN is a relatively simple process, but is extremely time consuming and
labor intensive. Current techniques rely on manually analyzing the traffic and require knowledge
of the inner workings of the vehicle and its various systems. Hermans et al. [25] and Huybrechts et
al. [28] outline a technique for locating features in source code and applying it to CAN data. The
proposed reverse engineering process consists of five steps.
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1. Research: 1st step is investigate how the car is built and what functionality it has, ABS,
traction control, etc. It is also recommended to look up which network these functions are
located and the interconnections between these networks.
2. Interfacing: 2nd step is interfacing with the CAN bus. In this step, one needs to collect as
much data as possible. Storage of these messages is needed for further analysis. Interfacing
with the CAN bus is typically done through physically connecting with the OBD port or
another indirect connection.
3. Identifiers: 3rd step is to link the found CAN IDs to their corresponding ECUs. Combining
this step with the previous step provides information on which signal corresponds to which
message. 2 main methods are proposed for this step. 1st is to manually unplug each ECU
one by one and note which IDs disappear from the network. However, this may change the
behavior of the other ECUs. The other method is to insert gateway nodes between target
ECU and rest of network. This allows for observation of the data flow.
4. Analysis: 4th step is finding the essential data. In this step, correlation between data points
and features are found. This is a tedious step of monitoring all data to find its correlation to
messages.
5. Unknown data: The final step is analyzing the unknown messages. Combining IDs with
possible messages, while reducing the combinations as more IDs get linked.
The effort here is to automate these steps as much as possible.
6.1.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning algorithms excel in prediction and classification. They are generally used
to investigate the correlation between different inputs, also known as features, to approximate an
output or discover interesting connections. Machine learning algorithms can be broken up into two
main categories:
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• Supervised learning: Machine learning algorithm that has a training set that includes both
the input data and output data. The algorithm is trained to learn a mapping of inputs and
outputs.
• Unsupervised learning: Machine learning algorithm has a training set that only has input
data but not the expected output.
The classification of CAN messages is a time series classification problem. There exists many clas-
sification techniques, but most of them are designed for problems with multiple input features and
an corresponding class. The issue with time series data is that these features are not independent
from each each other. However, it is still possible to use classification techniques by extracting
different features based on the series and using those for classification.
6.2 Related Work
Cyber attacks towards modern vehicles executed by injecting spoofed messages to the CAN bus
has spawned numerous research efforts towards improving the security of modern vehicles. Koscher
and Checkoway et al. [38, 9] were the first to demonstrate physical and remote security breaches in
automotive systems. Both research groups injected malicious messages to take control of various
vehicle systems such as brakes and engines. Valasek and Miller [51] demonstrated real-world attacks
on multiple vehicles via remote hacking to cause a Jeep to brake and crash into a ditch. Their work
lead to a Chrysler recall of 1.4 million vehicles.
To detect attacks, some works use machine learning approaches. Kang et al. [32] trained a deep
neural network structure to classify normal vs attack messages using probability-based features of
the message bits. Using normal and attack data, the system was able to be trained to recognize
specific attacks. Taylor et al. [81] used a long short-term memory networks to detect attacks
on the CAN bus. Their approach was applied to the identifier, and learned to predict the next
message ID. This method assumes repetitive periodic sequences of messages and highly surprising
message bits were flagged. Narayanan et al. [61] proposed building a Hidden Markov Model of
normal behavior of the vehicle using sensor values. Their work showed it is possible to detect
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data manipulation attacks. They focused on the signal changes rather than the signal values. The
result was a model that served to detect signal jump types of anomalies. Kang et al. [33] proposed
an automated process for correlating CAN messages with its ECU by creating a machine learning
classifier trained on multiple vehicles. Their approached utilized the time stamp, CAN ID, and data
fields and determined that a nearest neighbor approach would have the best success as a classifier.
They evaluated multiple machine learning approaches using the same training data to draw their
conclusion.
Lestyan et al. [43] proposed a method of identifying and extracting vehicle sensors from raw
CAN data to infer personal driving behavior. Their approach examined each message data bit for
the probability that it was 1. Using random forest, their algorithm output a binary value indicating
whether the message belonged to a certain class or not.
These detection approaches require the analysis of raw CAN messages by manually inspecting
high volumes of data to reverse engineer message syntax and semantics to reconstruct the vehicle
operations and contextualize the messages. Literature on network traffic analysis and automatic
recognition of the nature of given network packets already exists [100, 98, 92, 93, 91, 88, 71, 73, 70,
67, 56, 53, 26, 20, 63]. However, these works are inapplicable to the automotive network as CAN
has different protocols. CAN messages do not include source nor destination addresses nor port
numbers. IT networks also have a clear separation between network and application layers which
is not the case with CAN.
There is research in the reverse engineering and translation of CAN messages. Marchetti and
Stabili [46] proposed READ, a novel algorithm for automatic reverse engineering of CAN data
frames. READ analyzes traffic traces containing unknown CAN messages to identify and label the
signal type based on their data frames. Their method isolates counters and cyclic redundancy checks
(CRCs), among other values, to label the signals. Verma et al. [86], proposed a simple algorithm
to extract CAN message signals and label them using OBD-II PIDs. Their algorithm, ACTT:
Automotive CAN Tokenization and Translation, leverages diagnostic information to parse CAN
by breaking messages into tokens and then learning the translation from bits to vehicle function.
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Their signal extraction only identifies signals that do not have a contiguous set of bits. Pese et
al. [65], developed a tool called LibreCAN, which translates CAN messages. This tool captures the
bit-flip rate of messages and uses them along with body data from a phone to classify messages.
The main limitation of these works is the few features that can be extracted and analyzed from
CAN traffic. This is due to the fact that a vehicle is typically required to manually reverse engineer
the CAN IDs and to validate results. This issue can be mitigated if access to the complete specifica-
tions of CAN messages were available. However, as CAN IDs and their functions are manufacturer
trade secrets, it is difficult to reverse engineer CAN messages. Additionally, manufacturers have
an incentive to prevent reverse engineering of their CAN messages, as it is the main deterrent for
hackers. This paper proposes the novel contribution of reverse engineering CAN messages without
the need for a physical vehicle.
6.2.1 Ground Truth Data
6.2.1.1 DBC file
A .dbc file (database for CAN) contains the translation for all CAN messages in a particular
vehicle. This file is typically held secret by manufacturers and varies per make and model. DBCs
contain the signal definitions, segment position (start and end bits), binary to decimal encoding
scheme, and the conversion information for translating the decimal to meaningful physical value.
The DBC also includes message timing information such as frequency and whether the message
timing is constant or triggered by an event, and the corresponding ECU(s) responsible for a message.
Nearly all research requires reverse engineering some of the information of DBCs.
6.2.1.2 J1939
CAN data can follow the Society of Automotive Engineers standard SAE J1939 [72], which is
the vehicle bus recommended practice for vehicle component communication and diagnostics. SAE
J1939 has been widely adopted by diesel engine manufacturers for use in large tractors and trucks.
This standard defines that all J1939 packets, except for the request packet, should contain eight
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bytes of data and a standard header which contains a Parameter Group Number (PGN), that is
embedded in the message’s 29-bit identifier. A PGN identifies a message’s function and associated
data. J1939 attempts to define standard PGNs to encompass a wide range of automotive and other
vehicle purposes.
6.3 Proposed Work
In this section, I propose to reverse engineer CAN messages without manually testing on a
physical vehicle and without the need of a CAN (DBC) file. I describe the process of extracting
CAN message features and their utilization in machine learning techniques. I utilize machine
learning techniques to reduce the obstacle of reverse engineering CAN messages by identifying
important CAN messages and their functions. The contribution of the work can be broken down
into:
• A supervised learning approach that extracts and identifies CAN data changes and labels
specific IDs corresponding to vehicular functions.
• An unsupervised clustering approach that classifies unknown CAN messages using the labels
learned with the supervised learning approach. Unknown CAN functions are extrapolated
from known CAN messages.
The work provides an early demonstration that by utilizing machine learning techniques, it is
possible to reverse engineer CAN message functions without needing to manually test against a
physical test vehicle. The work indicates that the absence of a DBC file does not necessarily prevent
a researcher or attacker from deriving the meaning of individual CAN messages.
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6.4 Classifying Controller Area Network Messages
6.4.1 Feature Extraction
6.4.1.1 Message Feature Extraction
First needed was to extract the CAN fields and features required for the approach, as machine
learning approaches require specific input feature formatting to properly generate classification.
A simple a CAN message parser that extracts CAN IDs, time stamps, and data fields for every
message was developed. These CAN fields are used to create ordered dictionaries and lists of CAN
messages with the same ID. For the feature engineering process, it was determined it was pertinent
to choose features that are standard to all vehicles. The CAN fields the parser extracts are in all
CAN messages regardless of vehicle’s make or model. Additionally, these CAN fields are used to
extract other features such as message timings and distances.
6.4.1.2 CAN Function Extraction
Without the full CAN specification, researchers need to reverse engineer CAN messages to
determine their functions and respective data details. The typical method of reverse engineering
this information is to manually test individual CAN messages on a physical vehicle. I propose an
alternative method to reverse engineer CAN messages with the use of labeled time frames that
correspond to specific vehicular functions and a data change algorithm that detects CAN messages
with changing data bits. I hypothesize that there are specific CAN messages that correspond to
specific vehicular functions. For example, when a vehicle is braking, the brake controller is active,
therefore a certain ECU is transmitting braking signal to the brake from the brake pedal. The data
field of this certain CAN ID is changing as the brake pedal pressure is increasing and the brake is
being engaged. I utilize a CAN data bit change detector in combination with labeled CAN logs to
reverse engineer a few CAN messages.
The supervised learning approach takes as input a labeled CAN data set that detailed what
the vehicle was doing in certain time frames. The approach monitors all the CAN messages in
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the time frame for data bit changes. The reasoning is that data changes in CAN messages corre-
spond to vehicular functions. Identifying which CAN messages have data changes during different
vehicle functions can identify the CAN messages that relate to specific vehicular functions. The
contribution here is that given minimal knowledge on what the vehicle is doing in certain time
frames and by detecting CAN messages with changing data bits, it is possible to reverse engineer
some CAN message functions. The current method of reverse engineering CAN messages requires
physical testing of a vehicle or obtaining the full CAN message specification, our approach provides
an alternative method of deriving CAN message functions. The data change detection approach is
described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Obtaining data values for CAN data frame and checking for data bit
changes
Data: CAN Data Raw
Result: List of CAN IDs and training features
training features = [”CAN ID”:[], ”Time Stamp”:[], ”Data”:[], ”Vehicle Function:[]]
for Every message in CAN Log do
Parser(message): To obtain individual CAN fields
for Every CAN ID do
Create dictionary of CAN fields and data
Continuously monitor data field bits for changes
if message data bit changes then
Record CAN ID and vehicular function
else
pass
Return CAN data fields and training features
The algorithm associates labels with CAN messages with respect to their vehicular function.
CAN function extraction is important in the next step of the approach as it provides CAN message
labels to help classify unknown CAN messages. Given that the data sets are unlabeled, this
approach provides the labeling needed for the machine learning approaches.
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6.4.2 Clustering
The goal of clustering is to identify structure in an unlabeled data set by organizing the data
into groups where within-group-object similarity is minimized and the between-group-object dis-
similarity is maximized. Most clustering analysis has been performed on static data. Data is static
if all their feature values do not change with time. Han and Kamber [24] classified clustering
methods developed for handling various static data into five categories: partitioning, model-based,
grid-based, density-based, and hierarchical methods.
Partitioning methods build k partitions from the data. Each partition represents a cluster
containing at least one object. The partition is crisp if each object belongs to exactly one cluster,
or fuzzy if one object is allowed to be in multiple clusters. Two known methods for partitioning
are the k-means algorithm [45], where each cluster is represented by the mean value of the objects
in the cluster and the k-medoids algorithm [35], where each cluster is represented by the most
centrally located object in the cluster.
Model-based methods assume a model for each of the clusters and attempts to best fit the data
into the assumed model. There are two major approaches of model-based methods: statistical and
neural network approaches. An example of a statistical approach is AutoClass [10]. This uses
Bayesian statistical analysis to estimate the number of clusters. Two methods of neural network
approaches are competitive learning [6] and self-organizing feature maps [37].
Grid-based methods quantize the object space into a finite number of cells that form a grid
structure, this is where the clustering is performed. STING is a typical example of a grid-based
approach, it uses several levels of rectangular cells corresponding to different levels of resolution.
Statistical information regarding the cell attributes are pre-computed and stored. A query process
usually starts at a high level of the hierarchical structure. Each cell in the current level computes
its confidence interval to the given query. Irrelevant cells are removed from further consideration.
This query process continues to the next lower level until the bottom layer is reached.
Density-based methods, such as DBSCAN [17], grow a cluster as long as the number of ob-
jects(density) in the “neighborhood” exceeds some threshold. Another approach, OPTICS [2],
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computes an augmented cluster ordering for automatic and interactive clustering analysis. The
ordering contains information that is equivalent to density-based clustering.
Hierarchical clustering method works by grouping data into a tree of clusters. There are gener-
ally two types of hierarchical clustering: agglomerative and divisive. Agglomerative methods start
by placing each object in its own cluster, and then merges clusters into larger and larger clusters.
This process ends when all objects are in a single cluster or until specific end conditions, such as
desired number of clusters, are met. Divisive methods do the opposite of agglomerative. Divisive
methods start with a single large cluster that contains all the objects, and then splits clusters into
separate clusters until a specific end condition is met. Hierarchical clustering is unable to make
adjustments once a merge has happened. To improve the clustering, there is a trend to combine
hierarchical clustering with other methods. Chameleon [34] and CURE [22] both perform careful
analysis of the object ”linkages” at each split or merge.
CAN data is not static however, but is an example of time series data that has values that change
with time. Similar to static data, time series clustering requires an algorithm that forms clusters
given a set of unlabeled data. Most methods try to modify existing approaches for clustering static
data in a way that converts time series into a form of static data. I propose utilizing clustering
towards classifying unknown CAN messages. Clustering machine learning techniques assume that
instances of a particular class have data profiles that cluster into centroids. Each new data point
can then be classified according to its distance from that centroid. Clustering approaches can be
applied to unsupervised learning.
6.4.2.1 Hierarchical Clustering
I utilize hierarchical clustering towards reverse engineering CAN message functions. A basic
understanding of how K-means clustering works is needed to explain hierarchical clustering. K-
means can be broken down into these sections:
1. Decide number of clusters (k)
2. Select random points from the data as centroids
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3. Assign all points nearest cluster centroid
4. Calculate centroid of new clusters
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4
This is an iterative process, it keeps running until the centroids of newly formed clusters do not
change or the max number of iterations is reached. The issue with K-means clustering is that
it always tries to make the clusters the same size. Additionally, the number of clusters needs to
be defined at the beginning of the algorithm. Realistically, the number of clusters is unknown.
Hierarchical clustering aims to address these issues. This is an example of unsupervised learning.
I implement agglomerative clustering, a type of hierarchical clustering, to cluster CAN messages
together by related vehicular functions. Each CAN ID is assigned as a single cluster and I iterate
through the IDs and their respective distance measurements, then CAN ID clusters are merged
starting with the nearest neighbor. By grouping CAN IDs together, related CAN IDs are clustered
together by related function. Therefore, if certain CAN IDs have a known function, the functions
of unknown CAN IDs can be determined.
I combine a supervised learning approach that reverse engineers some CAN ID message functions
and then using these extracted labels towards classifying other unknown CAN message functions
with the use of agglomerative clustering.
6.5 Reverse Engineering using Machine Learning
The current method of reverse engineering CAN messages requires physical testing of a vehicle or
obtaining the full CAN messages specification. Manufacturers treat the full message specification as
trade secrets, so this is an approach that is difficult to take. The other approach requires manually
injecting individual messages and observing the changes in the vehicle to determine each message
function. My contribution is a process that simulates the physical vehicle message injection, given
minimal knowledge on what the vehicle is doing at certain time frames and by detecting which
CAN messages have changing data bits. I describe the approach in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Get data values for CAN data frame and check for data bit changes
Data: CAN Data Raw
Result: List of CAN IDs and training features
training features = [”CAN ID”:[], ”Time Stamp”:[], ”Data”:[], ”Vehicle Function”:[]]
for Every message in CAN Log do
Parser(message): To obtain individual CAN fields
Time Stamp = msg.TS
Message ID = msg.ID
Data Fields = [msg.D1, msg.D2, msg.D3, msg.D4, msg.D5, msg.D6, msg.D7, msg.D8]
for Every CAN ID do
Create or update dictionary of CAN fields and data
[”CAN ID”: msg.ID, ”Time Stamp”:msg.TS, ”Data”:Data Fields]
Continuously monitor data field bits for changes
for Every Data Field in CAN ID message do
if new Data Field not equal to past Data field then
Record CAN ID and vehicular function
training features.update(”CAN ID” = msg.ID, ”Time Stamp” = msg.TS,
”Data” = Data Field, ”Vehicle Function” = Current Vehicle Action Label)
else
pass
Return CAN data fields and training features
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The core of the work is to reverse engineer CAN messages with respect to their vehicular
function. Raw CAN is unlabeled and requires proprietary information from the manufacturer to
reverse engineer. This is a major impediment to researchers and attackers, and the aim is to address
this obstacle. The work utilizes raw CAN data, captured from a variety of vehicles to derive CAN
clusters. The aim is to circumvent the need for a physical test vehicle and manufacturer specific
data towards reverse engineering CAN messages.
The process involves reading CAN data, calculating the distances between all CAN IDs, merging
nearest IDs together to form clusters, and using these clusters to classify unknown CAN IDs. I
utilize Euclidean distance as the distance metric between CAN messages.
Message1 = m1 = (x1, y1)
Message2 = m2 = (x2, y2)
Euclideandistance =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2
The CAN IDs with the smallest distance are merged and this process iteratively continues until
there are k clusters left. The clusters left are grouping the different CAN messages together by
their respective functions.
The work is two-fold, the labeling of the clusters and the visualization of clusters. A tool
utilized for the clustering is a dendrogram, Algorithm 3. This is a tree-like structure that records
the sequences of merges. It is used to visualize hierarchical clustering and determines the optimal
number of k clusters. The tree-like structure records the sequences of merges of the leaves, in this
case the CAN messages. In addition to depicting how the CAN IDs merge, the dendrogram also
details the distances between IDs and clusters.
The clustering approach creates clusters of CAN messages that are related by their vehicular
function. Unfortunately, without labels for these CAN IDs, it is not possible to determine what
these clusters represent, as they are just groupings of unknown CAN messages. To solve this issue,
the CAN message labels previously derived are utilized in the supervised learning approach. Using
these labels, which relate specific vehicular functions to certain CAN IDs, are applied labels to
unknown CAN messages.
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Algorithm 3: Pseudocode for creating a dendrogram and returning predicted data clus-
ters
Data: Distance values
Result: Dendrogram and cluster labels
#Create distance matrix;
matrix = DataFrame(squareform(distance values));
#Create dendrogram;
dendrogram = scripy.dendrogram(linkage(distance values));
#Create clusters;
cluster = AgglomerativeClustering();
cluster.predict(matrix);
Return dendrogram and clusterings
Algorithm 4: Clustering CAN IDs and labeling of messages
Data: CAN Data Raw
Result: CAN Message Clusters
[”Cluster”:”Label”, ”CAN IDs”:[]]
for Every message in CAN Log do
Parser(message): To obtain individual CAN fields
for Every CAN ID do
Calculate the distance of this message from every other message
for Every Message do
Merge closest CAN IDs
Continue merges til K clusters are created
Return CAN data fields and training features
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In the following section, I will analyze the CAN labels and the clusters that our approaches
generated. I detail the process of verification and validation of the reverse engineering process. I
demonstrate that the algorithms are correlating CAN messages to specific vehicular functions, and
that these correlations can create labels for the CAN messages. I am also able to cluster CAN
messages by their relative and related functions. Combining the clusters and labels enable reverse
engineering of CAN message functions.
6.6 Evaluation and Analysis
I discuss the evaluation criterion for the CAN message classification using clustering machine
learning. I analyze the CAN labels and the clusters that the approach generated and detail the
process of verification and validation of the reverse engineering process. I demonstrate that the
algorithms are correlating CAN messages to specific vehicular functions, and that these correlations
can create labels for the CAN messages. I am also able to cluster CAN messages by their relative
and related functions. Combining the clusters and labels enable reverse engineering of CAN message
functions.
6.6.1 Data
For training machine learning algorithms, CAN data was required for the research, we obtained
CAN traffic logs from Oak Ridge National Labs. They had a vehicle set up on a dynamometer,
a treadmill system that simulates real road operation. CAN traffic was captured by connecting
through the On-Board Diagnostic port under the dash of the vehicle. The data captured represents
the vehicle under-going different driving modes, from accelerating to braking. The CAN data was
captured and logged into comma separated values in an excel file. While this format was good for
human readability, it had to be converted into a data frame understood by the machine learning
algorithms and visualization functions.
Additionally, we had captured CAN data from a John Deere tractor has it tillage various loca-
tions in Iowa. This CAN data followed the J1939 standard, which gives more detailed information
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on the CAN data that was not present in the Oak Ridge data set. The difference between J1939
standard data and the data captured by Oak Ridge, is that the CAN IDs are unknown in the Oak
Ridge data, while the J1939 data details what each ID represents. This J1939 data was used as a
ground truth in our evaluation procedure because this data had the reverse engineered information
we were trying to extract from raw data.
6.6.2 Simulation
I created a simulated data set of 10 different CAN IDs, simulating a driving mode and a braking
mode. This data log had messages with different frequencies and message intervals to simulate real
data. There were 5 IDs specifically related to driving and another 4 IDs related to braking, with
1 message that was transmitted during both modes. This data was used to verify and validate
the algorithms as a control group. Given that raw CAN data is dependent on the vehicle it was
captured from, the simulated data gave a baseline to understand the workings of the algorithms
when applied towards raw captured CAN data. Running the simulated data through the clustering
algorithm to classify the CAN IDs into their vehicular mode clusters.
The clustering algorithm and dendrogram required a distance matrix to be created. This matrix
represents all the distance metrics for the CAN IDs, Figure 6.1. The matrix was passed into our
dendrogram creator and clustering algorithm to cluster the CAN messages. The dendrogram,
Figure 6.2, is created from the leaves first to create the cluster tree. The dendrogram shows that
there are two clusters of the CAN IDs, which is expected since I simulated two separate driving
modes of braking and accelerating. Our clustering algorithm confirmed the dendrogram results.
CAN IDs 1-6 were designated as accelerating and were clustered into one group, and CAN IDs
7-10 were designated as braking and clustered into another group. The simulated data was used to
confirm the hypothesis and approach before applying them to real CAN data.
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Figure 6.1 Simulated distance matrix representing all distances between each CAN ID.
Braking IDs ClusterDriving IDs Cluster
Figure 6.2 Dendrogram for simulated data. This figure shows how each CAN ID clustered
with the other IDs. It also shows the two major groupings for the CAN IDs.
6.6.3 Oak Ridge Real CAN Data
The 2nd data set was CAN traffic logs from Oak Ridge National Labs [62]. They had a vehicle
set up on a dynamometer, a treadmill system that simulates real road operation. The CAN traffic
was captured by connecting through the On-Board Diagnostic port under the dash of the vehicle.
The data was not reverse engineered, as the CAN messages are unknown, but it captured the vehicle
driving in different modes, from accelerating to braking. This data was labeled based on the vehicle
operations. Typically CAN data captured is not reverse engineered, and to reverse engineer this
data requires manual injection. Each captured CAN message is injected into the vehicle to see how
the vehicle responds. Our supervised learning approach simulated this process by detecting CAN
messages with changing data bits due to different vehicular driving modes. Upon examining our
data set, it was determined there were 133 unique CAN IDs. Applying the approach, I aimed to
identify the significant CAN IDs and correlate them to specific vehicular functions.
Using Algorithm 1 and 2, these CAN IDs were identified, Table 6.1, and reasoned that they
have these specific functions. This conclusion was derived from a combination of knowing what the
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Table 6.1 Reverse engineered CAN IDs and their corresponding vehicular function
Vehicular Function CAN IDs
Drive 17C
Brake 467, 3C3
Shifter 171, 230
Windows and door lock 331, 332, 333
vehicle was doing at specific times in the log and utilizing the data change algorithm to detect which
IDs were changing during these times. By identifying these CAN IDs, it enabled assignment of
labels for the clusters generated with our clustering algorithm. With more data, the algorithms
would improve and be able to identify more CAN ID labels. The methodology applied here to
derive CAN message functions can be applied to various different vehicles as it does not require
any vehicle specific information on its messages.
The machine learning portion of the work clustered all the CAN IDs together. To accomplish
this, a distance matrix was created for this data, this returns the respective distances between
all the CAN IDs. The distance matrix was then used to create a dendrogram that visualizes the
clusters and determines K for the number of ideal cluster labels. The dendrogram, Figure 6.3,
showed 4 major clusters. When applying the clustering algorithm to the data set, it returned 4
clusters, determined by the dendrogram. The dendrogram and clustering algorithms clustered the
driving and braking CAN IDs in different clusters. CAN ID 17C for driving and IDs 230 and 171
for gear shifter are in the green cluster, whereas braking 467, 3C3 and other uncommon functions
such as door lock were clustered in red.
[Brake][Driving]
Figure 6.3 Captured raw data dendrogram, clustered the CAN IDs into 4 major groupings.
66
Cluster Label (Vehicle Function) CAN IDs
0
(Driving)
‘216’, ’217’, ‘214’, ‘213’, ‘37B’, ‘3CC’, ‘92’, ‘326’, ‘336’, 
‘40A’, ‘483’, ‘366’, ‘265’, ‘422’, 415’, ‘416’, 3B6’, ‘410’, 
‘411’, ‘596’, ‘312’, ‘43D’, 43E’, ‘82’, ‘83’, ‘81’, ‘85’,  ‘3B3’, 
‘24A’, ‘3B7’, ‘24C’, ‘24B’, ‘3B8’, ‘368’, ‘369’, ‘367’, ‘423’, 
‘365’, ‘581’, ‘42C’, ‘440’, ‘42D’, ‘440’, ‘42D’, ‘242’, ‘59E’, 
‘2A1’, ‘434’, ‘430’, ‘453’, ‘455’, ‘333’, ‘332’, ‘179’, ‘178’, 
‘175’, ‘171’, ‘4B0’, ‘185’, ‘78’, ‘91’, ‘165’, ‘166’, ‘167’, 
‘25B’, ‘25C’, ‘25A’, ‘17C’, ‘33B’, ‘35E’, ‘156’, ‘3AB’, ‘3AA’, 
‘230’, ‘7D’, ‘7A’, ‘5B3’, ‘47’, ‘42’, ‘41’, ‘20A’, ‘471’, ’14B’, 
‘352’, ‘200’, ‘202’, ‘204’, ‘350’, ‘77’, ‘76’, ‘485’, 484’, ‘4B’, 
‘4C’, ‘4A’, 486’, ‘3A8’, ‘476’, ‘477’, ‘474’, ‘475’, ‘2EC’]
1
(Brake)
‘439’, ‘454’, ‘3C7’, ‘3C3’, ’43C’, ‘3EB’, ‘3EA’, ‘84’, ‘2F1’, 
‘447’, ‘446’, ‘386’, ‘431’, ‘331’, ‘482’, ‘465’, ‘467’, ‘466’, 
‘488’, ‘38D’, ‘3B4’, ‘472’, ‘473’]
2 ‘5A5’, ‘5B5’
3 ‘86’, ‘87’, ‘4BE’, ‘4BF’, ‘600’
Figure 6.4 Cluster labels from Oak Ridge
Using these labels, it classified the functions of unknown CAN IDs. To check the clusters, a few
other CAN IDs had to be reverse engineered manually. CAN ID 430, was identified as shifting to
drive. This ID was clustered together with with shifter (171, 230) and drive (17C). CAN ID 465
was identified as shifting to reverse. This ID was clustered together with brake (467, 3C3). This
results demonstrates that even given raw unlabeled CAN data, it is possible to reverse engineer
some CAN messages and using these known IDs, extrapolate other unknown IDs.
While these results are promising, the lack of reverse engineered data made verifying the results
challenging. To address this issue, CAN data that followed the J1939 standard was obtained.
This standard means that the PGNs are well-defined and therefore could validate the clustering
results. J1939 messages have an identifier, PGN (parameter group number), that defines the
message function. Where automotive CAN messages identify the message and the sending ECU,
J1939 messages define the message function and the source of the message.
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Table 6.2 Reverse engineered J1939 CAN IDs and their corresponding vehicular function
Cluster Label CAN Function
0 Driving Functions (Engine and brake controllers)
1 Proprietary IDs
2 Memory Access/Data Transfer IDs
3 Fuel IDs
4 Electrical Power and Lighting
6.6.4 J1939 Data
The 3rd data set was CAN data captured from a John Deere tractor as it performed tillage
operations at different sites. This data set is raw, has no labels, and contains over 300 CAN IDs.
However, because this data followed the J1939 standard it allowed for greater detailed analysis. I
were able to evaluate the following:
• Accuracy measurements: Determine the percentage of correctly and incorrectly classified
CAN messages
• K clusters: Determine the effect that increasing K has on the CAN message classifications
• Message correlations: Determine how the messages are correlated together
Starting with the same algorithms and processes detailed above for the first 2 data sets, a dis-
tance matrix was created for this data. This distance matrix was then used to create a dendrogram
to visualize the CAN clustering and determine the number of cluster labels. The algorithm re-
turned five clusters, Table 6.2. The largest cluster contained all the driving critical functions, such
as braking and engine controller. The other four clusters were much smaller and contained propri-
etary IDs, electrical power/lighting messages, memory accesses, and data transfer IDs in separate
clusters.
I further examined the accuracy of classification for each cluster and the overall clustering of
all messages.
• Cluster 0 contained driving function, engine and brake controller, messages. In this cluster
there were 217 messages. 50 messages relating to engine/speed/brake, 15 messages relating to
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the aux valve, 15 messages relating to aftertreament and fluids, 87 proprietary messages, 24
miscellaneous messages such as diagnostics, data and time, and air pressure, and 29 unknown
messages.
• Cluster 1 contained only proprietary messages. There were 11 messages all label proprietary.
• Cluster 2 contained memory access messages. 8 messages in this cluster all relating to memory
access and data transfer.
• Cluster 3 contained fuel related messages. 7 of 8 messages in this cluster related to fuel, with
1 unknown message.
• Cluster 4 contained messages related to electrical/power/lighting. In this cluster 13 messages
related to light and electrical power, 14 proprietary messages, 6 miscellaneous messages such
as diagnostic, turbo, switch, and 10 unknown messages.
Overall, after removing all unknown and proprietary messages from the cluster, resulted in 102 out
of 135 correctly classified messages.
Using CANoe, a J1939 CAN analyzer, we were able to check the correlations between different
CAN signals to verify the message classifications. CANoe enabled the extraction of specific signals;
such as the accelerator pedal position, engine rpm and fuel rate, to analyze their correlations to
each other. Seen in Figure 6.5, that as the accelerator pedal was pushed, the engine rpm and
fuel rate increases. This is expected as this is real world vehicle behavior. Checking on each
individual classification, it is seen that accelerator pedal was in cluster X, engine rpm in cluster X,
and fuel consumption in cluster X. This shows that the algorithm was clustering related messages
together. CANoe enabled further signal analysis, to examine more CAN messages and evaluate
their relationships to each other.
Additionally, to further investigate whether increasing the number of clusters would give further
insight and details on the relationships between messages. By increasing K, I aimed to identify
more specific clusters. By going down the levels in the dendrogram, it determined that the next
level of clusters were at K equals to 8 and 11. Analysis of messages when K equals 8, Table 6.3.
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Figure 6.5 CANoe plots with 3 different yet related signals. Showing the relationship
between accelerator pedal and engine rpm and fuel rate.
This resulted in 93 out of 133 messages classified correctly and 30 incorrectly classified messages.
What was seen was that non-important message clusters got split whereas the major vehicle
function clusters remained consistent. These results also show that even having the full database file
for CAN and knowing the full specification of J1939, there are still unknown messages that aren’t
defined in J1939 and there are numerous proprietary messages. These undefined messages make it
difficult to fully reverse engineer all CAN messages. These complications increase in automobiles
that do not follow the J1939 standard.
However, these results show that even with different CAN logs from different types of vehicles
and following different standards, our algorithms were able to classify, identify, and label specific
CAN IDs by their respective functions. The algorithms do not require insider knowledge nor reverse
engineered data to classify CAN IDs. The only input required was raw CAN data logs. The results
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Table 6.3 Reverse engineered J1939 CAN IDs and their corresponding vehicular function,
with k = 8
Cluster Label Message Breakdown
0:Engine and brake controllers 72 Messages: 36 vehicle control messages, 14
aux vale messages, 9 aftertreatment and flu-
ids messages, 24 miscellaneous (diagnostics,
data and time, air pressure) messages, 3 ve-
hicle power messages
1:Proprietary IDs 8 Messages: 8 proprietary messages
2:Data Transfer IDs 5 Messages: 5 data transfer messages
3:Fuel IDs 2 Messages: 2 fuel messages
4:Electrical Power and Lighting 18 Messages: 13 electrical light messages,
5 miscellaneous (diagnostic, turbo, switch)
messages, 10 unknown messages
5:Fuel IDs 3 Messages: 3 fuel messages
6:Memory Access IDs 3 Messages: 3 memory access messages
7:Mix Messages 27 Messages: 13 fluid and gas messages, 4
speed control messages, 10 electric and power
messages
indicate that machine learning algorithms are able to classify CAN messages using raw CAN logs
as the input.
6.7 Summary
Through the analysis it was determined that there are 3 different levels of data abstraction:
1. Raw data: unlabeled and undefined CAN messages
2. Message definition: known message IDs and corresponding functions
3. Vehicle definition: known vehicle actions respective to time
Raw data is the most simple level of data to obtain. Researchers and attackers can easily obtain
raw data through online shared log files or sniff vehicle CAN traffic. The next level is to have the
message definition for the messages in raw data. This is difficult to obtain as there are many different
message definition depending on a variety of factors such as CAN standard, vehicle make, model,
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and manufacturer. To obtain this level of abstraction typically requires reverse engineering of each
message. Lastly, vehicle definition can be directly obtain by observing and controlling what the
vehicle is doing when the CAN data is collected or may be inferred by analyzing and understanding
the CAN messages that are being sent at given time frames. To infer vehicle definition using
message would require having the message definitions. What the work does is assist in abstracting
out these different levels from CAN data. The function of unknown CAN messages is determined
through a combination of supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques to determine
message and vehicle definitions.
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CHAPTER 7. MACHINE LEARNING TOWARDS AUTOMOTIVE
SECURITY
Intrusion detection systems detect attacks by looking for suspicious system activity. Tradi-
tion IDSs commonly detect known threats based on defined rules or behavioral analysis through
base-lining the network. However, as attackers become more sophisticated, they can bypass these
techniques, so there is a need for more intelligent intrusion detection. One way to address this issue
researchers are exploring is to apply machine learning towards intrusion detection. In this section
of the paper, a background on the different types of machine learning techniques will be detailed.
Machine learning techniques can be categorized as either supervised or unsupervised algorithms.
These two categories of algorithms can be broken down into further sub-categories. Supervised
methods are dependent on having lot of labeled data to train the algorithm what inputs correspond
to what outputs. Two subgroups of supervised learning is regression and classification. These
algorithms are very accurate in their predictions of the output given enough labeled input data.
• Regression: These algorithms predict a continuous quantity. Labeled data sets give ”correct”
input and output pairs. The algorithm then identifies what input features predict the desired
output.
• Classification: These algorithms also require labeled data sets. These data sets assign obser-
vations into discrete categories. If input x has label y then the output is z.
Un-supervised methods do not require pre-labeled data. The input data is clustered or grouped
together naturally. Clustering is the main approach of un-supervised learning. The input data is
grouped together in clusters depending on similarity of input and distance of variables. The main
advantage of these methods is that it does not require pre-labeled data, which is difficult to come
by and very time consuming to obtain.
73
The goal for applying machine learning toward vehicle security is to learn features that can
model a vehicle’s or driver’s normal behavior. The anomaly detector then detects deviations from
this normal behavior and classifies it as an attack. The aim is to apply these principles into HAIDS.
HAIDS is essentially a classifier that currently classifies CAN messages by their timings. With the
use of machine learning techniques the aim is to model vehicle driving modes by classifying CAN
IDs and grouping them together by their respective vehicular function. Then the anomaly detector
detects attacks that alter normal vehicle and driver behavior.
7.1 Related Work
7.1.1 Modeling Driver Behavior
Automotive driver modeling and fingerprinting is a popular area of research with numerous
works reporting the application of machine learning towards identifying the driver of vehicles.
Vehicle theft is a growing problem, and now with the integration of computer systems in vehicles,
this is opening up new avenues of vulnerabilities for attackers. Driver identification is important
to determine if the vehicle has been stolen. The following works use various methods to detect and
determine the driver of the vehicle [36, 87, 85, 40, 31, 11].
Choi et al. [36] researched driver distraction detection and driver identification by examining
driver actions using both Gaussian Mixture Model and Hidden Markov Model frameworks on CAN
traffic. The authors evaluated the potential to identify when a driver was distracted among 9
drivers and achieved an accuracy of 31.45% using HMM. Their analysis showed that the average
vehicle speed was lower when driver was distracted.
Wahab et al. [87] modeled individual driving behaviors and identified features that were effective
at profiling drivers. They conducted feature extraction based on Gaussian Mixture Model and
wavelet transform and showed that accelerator and braking were most effective at profiling drivers.
Van Ly et al. [85] proposed using inertial sensors to classify different drivers. Their goal was
to use the inertial sensors in smart phones to identify drivers by driving features. The authors
derived features from braking, accelerating, and turning to compare braking and turning actions
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using k-means and SVM algorithms. They used a k of 2 and a simple distance metric. Braking
was the most important feature to differentiate drivers.
Kwak et al. [40] modeled driver behavior to detect theft of vehicle using the various features
such as: fuel trim, oil temp, wheel velocity, and fuel consumption. The authors examined various
algorithms and determined that Random Forest had the best driver detection. The most important
features were long term fuel bank trim and transmission oil temperature.
Enev et at. [15] classified drivers with driving data collected on live roads. They divided the
range into two driving sections, running and parking. They derived brake pedal position, steering
wheel angle, acceleration, turning speed, driving speed, current gear, engine speed, and throttle
position. This work enriched the features derived from driving and parking. This is useful in SVM,
Random Forest, Naive Bayes, and k-nearest neighbor algorithms.
Authentication based on driver driving patterns has been found to be effective in identifying
and differentiating drivers. While these works have focused on characterizing driving behaviors, the
aim is to show it can further be expanded toward security in connected cars. Features derived most
were accelerator, brake, and steering wheel. I aim to enrich the feature set by examining CAN data
from multiple vehicles and utilize them towards securing the vehicles from malicious attackers.
7.1.2 Machine Learning for Automotive Intrusion Detection
Kang and Kang [32] proposed a machine learning based IDS approach using deep neural network
structure to monitor CAN packets. Their IDS consists of two modules. A monitoring module that
decides a type of CAN packet based on trained features of known attacks. Once the monitoring
module identifies a new attack, a profiling module records the attack model and updates the system
for an upcoming packet. These two modules would be embedded in each ECU to analyze CAN
packets. They used an unsupervised Deep Belief Net to capture underlying statistical features of
CAN data and used them to classify messages as benign or anomalous. The CAN data feature
extracted was the bit fields in the data field of CAN. Their approach counted the occurrences of the
bit ”1” in the data field. They reported a 99 percent detection ratio while keeping false positives
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under 1 to 2 percent through the use of software simulation. However, the authors evaluated their
approach using a simulator and not real normal and attack data.
Seo et al. [74] proposed GIDS (Generative Adversarial Nets based Intrusion Detection System),
GAN (Generative Adversarial Net) based intrusion detection system, using deep-learning model,
generative adversarial nets. Their proposed system extracted the patterns of CAN IDs from CAN
data by converting the bits into images. GIDS has two discriminators to estimate the probability
the message is real or fake. The authors showed that GIDS can learn to detect 4 unknown attacks
using only normal data.
These two works extracted the bits from the CAN ID and data fields and modeled the behavior
by statistical probability and patterns of the bits. When the bits demonstrated unexpected behavior
caused by different attacks, an anomaly was indicated.
7.2 Threat Model
Modern vehicles have many embedded systems and technologies that connect externally. Once
attackers get access to the internal system, they can manipulate the vehicle. Our threat model
assumes the attacker has already accessed the vehicle’s system by exploiting a vulnerability and is
trying to make the vehicle misbehave. I do not consider sniffing of the bus as a malicious attack,
as there are numerous 3rd party applications that connect through the vehicle’s OBD-II port for
system analysis. Therefore, the focus is on changes to the behavior of the vehicle caused by an
attacker.
The work focuses on being able to detect when an attacker is attacking a vehicle. I do this
by defining normal behavior of the vehicle and driver and differentiating attacker behavior from
normal. It has been demonstrated that each driver has specific driving characteristics unique to
them. It is reasoned that when an attacker is attacking a vehicle and trying to make it mis-behave,
this will deviate from normal driver behavior. An attacker has numerous attack avenues, but each
has similar end results of causing the vehicle to mis-behave.
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7.3 Feature Engineering
By having a couple of raw captured CAN data sets from Oak Ridge National Labs and some
labeled data sets from the Hacking and Countermeasures Research Lab. The different data sets
required different pre-processing. Raw CAN is presented in hexadecimal form and needs to be
reversed engineered to better understand what vehicular actions each CAN ID corresponds to and
what their data fields are saying about these vehicle actions. I had to pre-process the CAN data to
extract the features desired for the models. Also by defining when vehicle actions were occurring, as
an example the braking action starts when the CAN ID for brake light is transmitted. Acceleration
starts when accelerator pedal is pushed. These definitions are important to define such that it is
possible to model normal driving behavior. This data is used for the normal modeling of driver
behavior without fully labeled CAN data.
The HRCL data set was already reversed engineered, so the vehicle action and its respective
data value were already converted to human read-able form. With this data I had to split it up
for training and testing data. With data recorded from 10 different drivers I used 10-fold cross-
validation. I used 9 drivers for training data and 1 driver for testing data. This data set will be used
to test our anomaly detection. The reasoning being that an attacker essentially act as a different
driver, hence if it is possible to differentiate different drivers, it should be able to differentiate when
an attacker is attacking the vehicle.
Additionally, CAN values had to be normalized, Equation 7.1, for certain machine learning
algorithms such as clustering. Vehicle values have a variety of ranges, by normalizing them it
enabled consistency for distance measurements by making them all to be ranged between 0 and 1.
Xi = (xi −min(xi))/(max(xi) −min(xi)) (7.1)
In choosing the features, because different vehicles may have a multitude of different sensors, the
aim is to select common sensors in all vehicles, e.g. brake, accelerator, and wheel angle.
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7.4 Clustering
Clustering is a popular approach that does not require a lot of pre-labeled data. Given that
CAN signatures are dependent on the manufacturer and model, there is much variability in CAN
and would require a lot of reverse engineering of CAN to obtain pre-labeled data. Also there is very
little examples of live captures of attack data. Given these constraints on the data, it was chosen
to use this unsupervised learning technique for the work. The aim was to answer the question do
certain CAN messages cluster together and what extent can clustering be used to model normal
traffic and detect attacks?
Clustering is the grouping of objects so that objects belonging in the same cluster are more
similar to each other than those in other clusters. There are multiple types of clustering methods,
but will detail a few of the most common ones.
• K-means clustering is one of the most common methods due to its simplicity and performance.
It works by defining spherical clusters that are separable in a way so that the mean values
converge towards cluster centers. The cluster centers are selected randomly in the beginning
and recursively move until it is in the center of a its respective cluster. The K variable
represents the number of clusters in the end.
• Agglomerative clustering is similar to k-means cluster but this time each node starts as its own
center. Then pairs of clusters recursively merge together in a way that minimally increases a
given link distance.
• K-Nearest Neighbor falls under the category of supervised learning as a classification algo-
rithm. With a labeled training set, this algorithm can predict the class of new objects based
on its distance from neighbors. The K variable represents the number of neighbors who have
to say the new object is close.
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7.5 Future Work
Driving consists of a small set of maneuvers that are made up of various actions. These ma-
neuvers make up a sequence to take driver from point A to B. These maneuvers are defined and
constrained by the laws and rules of the road. Related works have shown that each driver has a
unique way of driving and this is reflected by driving features that can be extracted. Related works
have also shown that these driving characteristics is distinct enough to differentiate drivers.
While CAN messages are easily sniffed, the differences in CAN messages between vehicles
and manufacturers make understanding what is being transmitted difficult. A major obstacle in
automotive research is reverse engineering CAN messages, from understanding what vehicle sensor
each CAN ID corresponds to and to deciphering what the data fields feedback about these sensors.
Manufacturers secure their vehicles through this obscurity, by keeping their implementation of
vehicular CAN secret, this hinders mass attacks upon their vehicles. This requires researchers to
reverse engineer CAN to create the required labels needed for machine learning evaluation and
validation.
The proposed work is two-fold. First, proposed is to model normal vehicle and driver behavior
with machine learning algorithms by classifying CAN IDs. Current automotive CAN work require
manual reverse engineering of the raw hexadecimal CAN data specific to each individual vehicle.
This is extremely time consuming and requires access to a test vehicle and closed track. To simplify
this process by classifying CAN IDs to their vehicular function, broken up into 3 major categories:
braking, acceleration, and turning. I detail how to utilize clustering techniques to accomplish this.
There are numerous CAN messages being transmitted on the bus, many of these messages are noise
and non-driving related. Related works have shown that only some specific features are important
in modeling driver behavior. The work targets identifying these specific features.
Secondly, the aim is to utilize machine learning algorithms to detect variation in driving behavior
to identify malicious intrusions. A motivation of attackers is to make the vehicle misbehave. The
first part of the work models normal driving behavior using CAN features. Related works have
shown that there are detectable variations in driving features that can differentiate drivers. Building
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on this idea, and hypothesize that there are detectable variations in driving features during an
attack. The aim is to extract driving features and detect variations in these features using machine
learning algorithms for intrusion detection.
7.5.1 Intrusion Detection
An extension of our work in modeling normal driver behavior is detecting deviations in this
behavior. The goal of attacker is to make the vehicle misbehave, whether it be by injecting messages,
replaying messages, or taking over the vehicle. This deviation in driver behavior can be detected
using machine learning algorithms. Utilizing the normal driver behavior model built in the previous
section, this will enable the detection when the driver behavior changes due to malicious attackers.
We will build a model of CAN IDs respective to their vehicular function. Knowing when certain
CAN IDs occur during a vehicle, it should be possible to detect when CAN IDs deviate from their
normal clusters. Mathematically this may be represented by a distance measurement for a CAN ID
being greater than a certain threshold from its cluster. Using Equation (4), each CAN ID should
be within a certain distance from the center of its respective vehicular action. When this distance
is greater than a threshold value then the IDS will detect an anomaly. We will use the mean
and standard deviation of the feature values from the HCRL data set for clustering and intrusion
detection. This anomaly is seen when the data for a certain CAN ID is changing with a cluster
of CAN IDs that it normally doesn’t change with. For example a set of CAN IDs correspond to
braking, and the IDS detects a new CAN ID that is changing while braking is occurring.
To evaluate the detection of malicious attacks using our machine learning-based detection, the
HCRL data set will be used. Knowing HAIDS can detect message injection attacks with great
accuracy and low false positives. But what it the attacker has control of the vehicle and does
not need to massively inject messages? With the HCRL data set, it has the driving profile of 10
different drivers. Using 9 of them to train the normal profile and use the data from the last driver
to simulate an attacker. It is reasoned that an attacker essentially acts as a different driver, by
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trying to make the vehicle mis-behave. We will evaluate how accurately the approach can identify
when it is another driver acting upon the vehicle. To be continued.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examined methods for applying IDSs to securing automotive systems with an
overview of the techniques and a discussion of their advantages and disadvantages. I attempted to
clarify and unify the concept of anomalies and intrusion detection regarding automotive security.
This begins with identifying threat models for automotive security and identifying threats that
effect all vehicles and not just one specific model. From a technical perspective, IDSs can work
well for detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. Different implementations of anomaly detection
methods can detect different types of anomalies. Current approaches have a focus on message
injection attack detection because it is the main attack vector for hackers trying to make a vehicle
misbehave.
I proposed a hybrid intrusion detection system that combines two approaches of anomaly and
signature-based detectors. The anomaly detector is the wide-net that catches any anomaly. Where
the signature detector is the comb that can filter through the detected anomalies and detect intru-
sions. I implement and demonstrate a message timing-based anomaly detector that utilizes interval
and frequency features of CAN messages to detect message injection attacks. I also implement and
demonstrate a signature-based detector for detecting other attacks that do not alter message tim-
ings. Lastly, I combine these to detectors to complement each other for better detection accuracy
and false positive rates.
I also presented a novel application of machine learning towards the reverse engineering of
CAN messages. The proposed approach does not require prior insider knowledge about the CAN
messages. I proposed a supervised method to extract CAN message function by analyzing change
in their data fields respective to vehicular function. The results of this method are used to apply
labels in the unsupervised learning method.
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I proposed utilizing the machine learning approach of clustering to cluster CAN messages to-
gether based on their function. This approach results in numerous clusters of CAN IDs, and with
our previous labels we are able to classify the function for these unknown CAN messages. The
work is an initial step towards automating reverse engineering of CAN message features without
the need to physically and manually test messages on a live vehicle.
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[60] Michael Müter, André Groll, and Felix C Freiling. A structured approach to anomaly detec-
tion for in-vehicle networks. In Proc. of Information Assurance and Security (IAS), 2010.
[61] Sandeep Nair Narayanan, Sudip Mittal, and Anupam Joshi. Using data analytics to detect
anomalous states in vehicles. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.08048, 2015.
[62] Oak ridge national labs. https://www.ornl.gov/facility/ntrc/research-areas/
vehicle-systems.
[63] Depren Ozgur, Topalla Murat, Anarim Emin, and Ciliz M. An intelligent intrusion detection
system (IDS) for anomaly and misuse detection in computer networks. Expert Systems with
Applications, 2005.
[64] F. Pasqualetti and Q. Zhu. Design and Operation of Secure Cyber-Physical Systems. IEEE
Embedded Systems Letters, 7(1):3–6, mar 2015.
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